



- CONFIDENTIAL -



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Authority NND883078

FILE NO 307 - 6

NAME ZAMBALES FREE AREA,
HUNTERS-ROTC

SIGNATURE : DATE

1

REF ID	DATE	TIME	REPORTING SOURCE	LOCATION	CARRIER	SIGNALING				REMARKS
						TYPE	ROUTE	TELETYPE	Voice	
1	1968-07-07	0900-0930	STATION	7500' above sea level near WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
2	1968-07-07	0915-0925	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
3	1968-07-07	0925-0930	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
4	1968-07-07	0930-0945	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
5	1968-07-07	0945-1000	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
6	1968-07-07	1000-1015	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
7	1968-07-07	1015-1030	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
8	1968-07-07	1030-1045	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
9	1968-07-07	1045-1100	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
10	1968-07-07	1100-1115	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
11	1968-07-07	1115-1130	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
12	1968-07-07	1130-1145	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
13	1968-07-07	1145-1200	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
14	1968-07-07	1200-1215	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
15	1968-07-07	1215-1230	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
16	1968-07-07	1230-1245	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
17	1968-07-07	1245-1255	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
18	1968-07-07	1255-1305	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
19	1968-07-07	1305-1315	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
20	1968-07-07	1315-1325	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
21	1968-07-07	1325-1335	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
22	1968-07-07	1335-1345	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
23	1968-07-07	1345-1355	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
24	1968-07-07	1355-1400	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
25	1968-07-07	1400-1405	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
26	1968-07-07	1405-1415	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
27	1968-07-07	1415-1425	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
28	1968-07-07	1425-1435	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
29	1968-07-07	1435-1445	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
30	1968-07-07	1445-1455	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
31	1968-07-07	1455-1500	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
32	1968-07-07	1500-1510	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
33	1968-07-07	1510-1520	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
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35	1968-07-07	1530-1540	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
36	1968-07-07	1540-1550	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
37	1968-07-07	1550-1555	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					
38	1968-07-07	1555-1600	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE	WYOMING LINE					

REF ID: A-1
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
AMENDMENT: NO
PAGE: 2
DRAFTED BY: J. R. M.
APPROVED BY: A. F. M.
DATE: 7-16-68
TIME: 12:15 PM

ZAMBALES FREE AREA, HUNTERS-ROTC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NAME OF UNIT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MANUEL BARRETO
UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER

1. Complaints
2. Investigating Officer's Notes
3. Supporting Papers
4. NFG Ltr dtd 3 Mar 47 W/ltr dtd 16 Sep 46 from Adevoso withdrawing request for recognition of all pending Hunters-ROTC units.



REMARKS :

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Authority ~~NDUSS3077~~

G-3 Form No. 2

HEADQUARTERS
 PHILIPPINES-RYUKYU COMMAND
 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
 OFFICE RETAINED RECORD

SEQUENCE NO.

1022

RADIC CITE

G-3 File No. GSCP II 091 PI

Date:

28 February 1947

SUBJECT: Request for Recgn of Gris Unit
 FROM : Manuel D. Barreto

Type of Communication

Letter

GROSS REFERENCES

FOR ACTION BY: (file symbol only)	SUSPENSE DATE	CONCURRENCES		
		Filo Symbol	Initial	Date
GSCP II				
OFFICER TAKING ACTION (and initials)				
1st Lt Charles L. Homewood				
Policy : Non-Policy	Recommending			
	Approval			
(File Symbol)	(Action)	APPROVED		
TO: <i>AK</i>	FOR: <i>CH</i>	<i>CH</i> 28 Feb 47		

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Col Gerald F. Lillard:

Basic, ltr fr Manuel D. Barreto to CG, PHIRECOM, requesting
 recgn of the Zambales Military District, Hunters ROTC.

Charles L. Homewood
 1st Lt Charles L. Homewood

1. Concur: Maj C. H. Wentzell
 Chief, Unit Inv Sec
 2. Concur: Lt Col S. J. Palos
 Chief, Unit Branch
- JF*

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Date 13/3/47

HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYU COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

GSCFU 091 PI

1359

APO 707

3 MAR 1947

Mr. Manuel D. Barreto
Subic, Zambales
Philippines

Dear Mr. Barreto:

The Commanding General has directed that you be informed that the Zambales Military District, Hunters ROTC, purporting to be a guerrilla organization under your nominal control has not been favorably considered for recognition.

It is felt that the number of men recognized in the Miguel Ver Regiment, Hunters ROTC, a composite unit of the overall command under Col Eulutario Adevoso, constitutes a just and adequate acknowledgement of the military services performed by the Hunters ROTC unit.

This decision does not preclude individual requests for casualty recognition by injured personnel who desire to enter such claims. Upon request from interested individuals, appropriate casualty forms will be forwarded.

Sincerely,

R. E. CANTRELL

CAPTAIN, AGD

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

Col Gerald F. Lillard:

Basic, ltr fr Manual D. Barreto to CG, PHILRCOM, requesting recgn of the Zambales Military District, Hunters ROTC.

1st Lt Charles L. Rosewood

1. Concur: Maj C. H. Wentzell
Chief, Unit Inv Sec

2. Concur: Lt Col S. J. Palos
Chief, Unit Branch



7m

GSCFU Copy Filed w/ZOL File (BARRETO, Manuel D)
1-True Copy Filed w/Cer File (Zambales Military District)
Hunters ROTC

1-True Copy Filed w/TIN
1-True Copy Filed w/Cer

GSCFU Comback Copy

26 Feb 47

GSCFU

Tel 330

HOTTEST VETERAN'S SERVICE
1615 Andalusia, Manila

16 September 1946

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Units' Requests for Recognition from
GAD, C-3, AFWEPAC File, request for.

TO : The Chief of Guerrilla Affairs Branch,
C-3, AFWEPAC

1. Request withdrawal of all recognition requests from
my organization, The Hunters or BOTS Guerrillas.

2. Exceptions to this request are the cases of the "Bini-
sum Fighters" of the Batanes Islands, and, that of the guerrilla
casualties'.

3. Request further that this be granted after the an-
nouncement of official recognition of the "Lat Hunters-ROTC
Guerrilla Cadre Regiment" which includes most of the strictly
deserving members of my unit.


s/ Terry "Magtengol" Adverso
t/ TERRY "MAGTENGOL" ADVERSOS
Major, D.F., O-42208 RA
Acting Legion Commander

REPRODUCED:
28 Feb 47

J. L. G. / J. L. G.
PROFACIO CAMILLO
1st Lt Inf AIB
Chief, Records Section

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UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS
ZAMBALES UNIT
SUBIC
(Attached to Luzon Guerrilla Forces)

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE HUNTERS
R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS OF ZAMBALES

On the early part of September, 1945 - two officers, Capt. Leonardo Aquino and Capt. Amado Santos of the Hunters R.O.T.C. Guerrillas Headquarters near Manila came to Zambales. As sent by their Commanding Officer, Col. Terry Magtangol, these officers had two important missions to undertake. It was up to them to message and make out all the necessary steps so as to accomplish their mission.

One of their missions was to acquire arms and ammunitions to be sent to their Headquarters and the other was to have a G-2 (Intelligence) Unit in Zambales. What can help is giving important military information regarding the enemy. The first mission was intended as Zambales was near Batangas where arms were left lying on the battlefield. As the Japs were starting to construct and establish bases and several military objectives, the next mission was considered of great importance.

The two officers made their secret headquarters on the small barrio of Matain, within the jurisdiction of Subic. Regarding the acquisition of arms, these two officers organized a small body of men for that purpose. These men composed of mostly courageous and reliable persons. They were well disciplined and obeyed readily the orders given them. The two officers did not have a hard time with their men. Thus began the Zambales Unit.

As other guerrilla organizations sprang up prior to the new unit, arms in Batangas became scarce as men had taken most of them beforehand. The small body of men indeed has a hard time getting firearms as they sailed at night in banca's all the way from Matain in Subic along the coastal waters of Batangas. They even reached as far as Mariveles near Corregidor. All sorts of danger and sufferings including big waves due to storms at sea, lack of food, keeping away from enemy fire, diseases, and other obstacles confronted these men but still they took it for they were all united and determined to fight the enemy. They did all what they can do defend their rights, safeguard their people and preserve their nation. All had the spirit of accomplishing their task whether it means their lives. Such was the military discipline enforced. A strict punishment for disobedience and disloyalty ruled over the men.

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Since then arms were constantly sent to Manila and the unit became so well organized.

On the other hand, the G-2 work started when the two Captains met Jose de la Paz, Jr., a former Guerrilla Officer of Zambales living in Matain. After a brief conference, Jose de la Paz, Jr. was designated as the G-2 Officer of Zambales. He got his official appointment with the rank of Captain thru Col. Terry Magtangol. Calixto Relente, a former guerrilla officer got the rank of 1st Lieutenant and was made the Assistant of Capt. de la Paz. To make the G-2 work more efficient, every town of Zambales had a G-2 representative. With the organization of the G-2 of Zambales, intelligence reports were sent constantly to the R.O.T.C. Headquarters near Manila.

Beside the Japs some civilians were a menace to the safety of the organization. To make things hum one has to be a contact man between civilians and the guerrillas. A Liaison Officer was needed and Jose de Ferio headed the Neighborhood Association of Matain was appointed as Liaison Officer with the rank of 1st Lieutenant. Being a guerrilla officer and a very influential man, he was suited for that position.

The Zambales Unit began to expand and induct more men with Captain Aquino and Captain Santos administering it. As a depression of food was raging at that time, one had to manage in getting food supply and making a fund for the unit. Luis Afable a resident of Subic was appointed as a Supply Officer with the rank of 1st Lieutenant. He had a truck that could transport supplies from one place to another and is known to many men that could contribute something for the welfare of the organization. Inasmuch the members suffered from lack of food, they became susceptible to certain diseases especially beri-beri and malaria. Doctor Oscar Novales, a well known doctor of Zambales voluntarily gave his services and was later appointed as Medical Officer of the outfit with the rank of 1st Lieutenant. Although medicines and other drugs were scarce and expensive, he did not hesitate to help. In fact he gave most of his medicines free for the unit and was able to acquire some from his doctor friends.

Some members of other Hunters R.O.T.C. Units near Manila came to join the Zambales men like Lt. Arsenio de Luna and Sgt. Jose de Guzman. They were sent to this province to take charge of the men that were to stay as mostly of the men of the outfit had to go to Marikina with Capt. Aquino and Capt. Santos for combat training.

The Zambales unit was made firm and solid when the men went for training for three months came back. Likewise, more men were inducted with the Unit. The organization marched on without the slightest knowledge of the Japs. Civilians through peaceful means were made to cooperate and asked to contribute something for the unit. The men stayed loyal and faithful notwithstanding the fact that numerous obstacles and tyranny of the Nips prevailed. Peace and order was enforced and an under-

ground justice ruled to help the oppressed and punish the wicked. Several men became crooks and wicked for the governing law was likewise a crook. Several Filipinos became traitors to their fellow men because of money and fame not heeding the cries and suffering of their people. Many were deprived of their rights, ruled by an iron hand. There was something to be done at that time and there was something done indeed.

Time came when the Zambales unit was given in charge to Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr.. This was when Capt. Santos and Capt. Aquino were ordered to be transferred to other units together with the men not from Zambales. Capt. de la Paz now was engaged in to most important duties, G-2 work and head of the combat unit.

During the administration of Capt. de la Paz, several changes were brought about. He set up a platoon of Negritoes with Enrique Vindua of Subic in charge. The latter being respected and obeyed by the negroes was able to convince and gather them and make them loyal followers. All in all the Zambales unit consists of a company of three platoons, a skeleton staff and G-2 representative in each town.

Lt. Benito Novales a guerrilla officer of one of the units of the same outfit came to join the Zambales Unit. He took charge of the combat company as Capt. de la Paz, and Lt. Relante were so much engaged with G-2 work. Lt. de Fario was efficient in his work so as with the other officers. As Capt. de la Paz was wanted by the Nips he changed his name to Capt. Joseph Paterno as pseudonym.

Another unit came into being in Maloma, San Felipe in the northern part of Zambales. This unit was under the command of Capt. Manuel Barretto and Lt. Amadeo Alines former G-2 representative of said place. This was by virtue of Capt. de la Paz, through the authorization given him.

The organization of the north Zambales unit (Hunters R.O.T.C. Guerrillas) was an advantage to the guerrillas especially to the southern unit. It was a very good source of food supply and agreeable place to get G-2 information especially concerning Japanese movements. After this, food was not a problem. Both units worked in liaison although communication from the Hunters R.O.T.C. Headquarters near Manila never reached Zambales during that time.

The Lunao Guerrilla Forces under the command of Col. Merfil was organized in the latter part of the Japanese occupation of which the Zambales District was formed and up to the present the province of Zambales was divided into four squadrons. Each squadron consisted of several sectors. The Zambales units of the R.O.T.C. Guerrillas were fused into the Lunao Guerrilla Forces as contacts with the Headquarters near Manila became impossible or difficult. Capt. de la Paz was designated to com-

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Author: MZS35072

- 4 -

mand Subic Sector under Squadron "D" while Capt. Barretto under Squadron "C". The Subic Sector recruited more men to comprise a battallion, but nevertheless the R.O.T.C. Boys were the cream of the crop.

At the coming of the Americans on January 29, 1945 the Guerrillas especially the R.O.T.C. boys went in conjuction with the American Army. Some went to the firing line while others were connected with various outfitts for guarding purposes even at present.

The guerrillas concerning the Hunters R.O.T.C. especially have done it before and will continue onward ever ready and willing to fight for the cause that we are all fighting for until the day victory is attained.

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UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS
ZAMBALES UNIT
SUBIC
(Attached to Luzon Guerrilla Forces)

ACTIVITIES OF THE HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS IN ZAMBALES

G - 2

I. Before attached to the Luzon Guerrilla Forces, USPIF

1. Intelligence work was started on Sept., 1943 when Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. head of G-2 in Zambales and Lt. Calixto Relente his adjutant went to different towns of the province and making the plans and strength reports of the Japanese barricades and garrisons and installations in every place. This was helped out by the different G-2 men appointed in each town.

2. Every report concerning the enemy was submitted every week secretly to the head of the G-2 in Zambales to be sent to the Gen. Hq. in Manila.

3. On Dec. 8, 1944 - Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. went to Olongapo to witness personally the Japs naval base and military establishments there with the help of Lt. Alfredo Codilla, the G-2 of the town. Mostly, things valuable for the unit concerning the enemy was obtained but not all as it was dangerous and the Japs were too suspicious. Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. was a friend of the Jap Capt. there so he was not suspected to be a spy.

4. Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. befriended a Jap Captain in Subic. He treated him well so as to know something about many things. The Jap officer was so fond of him and he told a lot of things and later, Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. was able to obtain and get information what was important.

5. Lt. Calixto Relente on Jan. 3, 1944, employed in the Jap Naval base at Olongapo as a Store keeper just to keep tract of everything and to obtain military secrets. He was frequently sending valuable reports but he didn't stay long enough as the Japs were too rude and harsh with Filipino employers.

6. The G-2 work in every town continued to send reports and military secrets twice a month.

7. Later, the Japanese moved to other parts in Zambales and only 25 to 30 Japs were left in each garrison except Olongapo, San Marcelino, San Antonio, Iba and Sta. Cruz. The Jap still had the ship building at Olongapo while air strip in San Marcelino

was started and coastal defenses were made at San Antonio and its barrios near the sea (China Sea).

8. As the air strip was begun in San Marcelino, military establishments were constructed there. Bombers and fighter planes stayed there and refuel so that it was converted to an air base. Camouflaged airplanes hangars were built. Likewise a force of a thousand Japanese with arms were stationed there to guard the air strip and they live in barracks. Construction was begun to make the base better and many people were employed. Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. sent a confidential person with good qualification to employ as foreman in the construction and good he got the job. He was secretly sent to make a map of hangars, barracks of soldiers and gasoline dumps, bomb dumps and also its ground movements. He was also assigned to take the strength of the soldiers there and sent reports every week and a map and plan was made including the scale and dimension of the enemy objective. Contact was made with the G-2 now in San Marcelino and later reported to Capt. Jose de la Paz to be sent to Manila.

9. The air base in San Marcelino was more fortified and more gasoline drums and airplanes were sent there. Reports and plans concerning this were also obtained thru the initiative of the G-2 in San Marcelino and Castillejos.

10. The Furukawa Mining companies were much observed as to the quantity of chromite and other metals sent to Japan and likewise the military strength of the Japanese guarding the mining companies.

11. Government officials were all also detected and observed as to their method of administration and given warning if they made an abuse of their position.

12. One Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) representative Sgt. Cawaguan came to Zambales to obtain military secrets and information about the enemy and to be sent without delay to the SWPA headquarters. As these AIB men had radio receiver and transmitter with them, contact was made efficiently and reports from the guerrilla unit was easily forwarded.

13. Another AIB representative, Sgt. Real came to Zambales to join Sgt. Cawaguan. He was escorted and protected by the unit when he went to the place wherethe latter was staying inner inland near the mountains west of San Marcelino. Later these AIB men moved close to Col. Merrill's Camp. The AIB representatives were very active in sending messages to the SWPA HQ.

14. Enemy war vessels and supply ships stayed by Subic Bay and along the coastal waters of Zambales. Every detailed information of these ships locations were sent to the AIB. Allied aircraft will be seen within a few days bombing and sinking these enemy vessels. This procedure went on until no enemy vessels was seen by the coastal waters along Zambales.

15. Allied planes bombed and destroyed the enemy planes

in the air strip thru the vital information to them by the AIB and by the G-2 work of the guerrillas.

II. Attached to the Luzon Guerrilla Forces, USPIF.

1. The Japs was beginning to abandon Zambales at the early part of January, 1945 when the Luzon Guerrilla Forces was organized in Zambales as the Americans have landed in Lingayen. Mostly all the Japs were concentrated at the Zig-zag pass between Zambales and Batangas. Still Jap barricades and a force of a hundred soldiers stayed in Olongapo and a little were in the air strip at San Narciso. Operation of the enemy were all observed and reported especially the kind of load that trucks carried. Allied planes continue to wreck the air strip and destroyed all the planes, barracks and other installations so the Japs finally abandoned it totally.

2. The information concerning gun emplacements and strength of Olongapo was obtained as a map was made to show all important details. This was made just a week before the Americans came to Zambales.

3. When the Americans were to land at San Antonio and San Narciso in Zambales they thought that the coast were still abode of Jap soldiers and fortifications. The R.O.T.C. Hunters thru Lt. Rosendo Soriano, a former telegraph supervisor of the Bureau of Post who made a contact with the coming Americans at night by means of blinking a flashlight send messages telling that the coast is safe for landing and there is no need to fire a single shot. This made the landing successful and likewise it save the towns of San Antonio and San Narciso and moreover the lives of the people perhaps. The Hunters R.O.T.C. made the contact with the American flag hoisted at the seashore save the town from shelling and bombings. This was made as early as 0600 in the morning of Jan. 29, 1945. Foreseeing possible dangers from shelling and bombings, Lt. Rosendo Soriano, Capt. Manuel Barretto and Lt. Amadeo Alinao of the Hunters R.O.T.C. unit in Maloma, San Felipe, dare risks and hit the nearest destroyer on a beam. Immediately the skipper of the destroyer sent messages to several of the American convoy ships that the shore is safe for landing. This three officers were very well appreciated by the Americans.

4. Jap collaborators and spies were all picked up and held prisoners at the guerrilla camp. This was due to the intelligence work done by the G-2 agents in tracking them down. Many spies composed of women who marry Jap soldiers and pretended to sell clothes in different places. They were forced to confess and squel everything they knew about the movements of the enemy from what their Jap husbands were telling them.

5. When the Americans came, the CIC in Subic was supplied with plenty of vital information concerning the Japs and especially the places where snipers were supposed to stay. All important matters that involves the affairs of the Jap-collaborator

were handed in for investigation. Likewise the guerrillas went to raid the places of the supposed Jap-collaborators at large especially Agoschin (Little Tokyo).

FIELD OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE COMBAT COMPANY

1. Before attached to the Luzon Guerrilla Forces

1. At the beginning of the organization of the Zambales Unit, the first activity undertaken was the acquisition of arms for the unit and for the other units near Manila. Raids were made in Batangas constantly especially at night. Men rode only in banca and suffered many hardships such as lack of food, diseases, stormy seas wherein their banca were mostly lost and their lives in complete danger. The Japs were also an obstacle as the men had to sail farther away from the shore to keep away from enemy fire. At that time, arms in Batangas were not so plentiful for many guerrilla outfits sprang up prior to the Zambales unit (Hunters ROTC) and they were arms in Batangas ever since.

2. Besides arms, the men were told to destroy enemy installations and keep track of enemy's fortifications and strength. Many missions were undertaken and was a success. One worth mentioning was on Jan. 4, 1944- when oil drums and plenty of munitions were set on fire at Grande Island, Subic Bay. This place was fortified by the Japs and had plenty of properties acquired as Batangas fell.

3. To keep the unit in secrecy and well organized, the men were strictly disciplined. A severe punishment was given to those who violates or disobeys orders. Civilians that were a menace to the unit, were treated accordingly but not given a third degree punishment. Many spies and Jap-collaborators often escaped to the Japs that was responsible for the torture and death of many men. Up to now several men are still missing as they were captured by the Jap Kempi. Several men were warned and frightened to change over a new leaf. Some rich people especially the producers made the prices so high that the common person could not afford. Town officials also made an abuse of their authority and social justice did not exist. Some men failed as he pleased especially when he had a strong pull with the Japs. An underground justice was really needed to help the oppressed and punish the wicked. In the long run with all the work and undertakings of the men, of the Zambales unit, all of crookedness made were corrected mostly but not completely.

4. The R.C. was also an enemy of the guerrillas. Knowing the country very well, they used to lead the Japs in raiding many places suspected to be abodes of G.I.'s. They were even worst than the Japs in punishing the people. At first, they were warned not to help the Japs but didn't pay attention to this. To put an end to all their doings, their headquarters was raided on the eve of Jan. 21, 1944 led by Capt. Leonardo Aquino and Capt. Amado Santos with a squad of brave armed men. Mostly of their arms were seized but

not complete yet. They would continue to oppose the government until the members of the R.C.P. had returned to India. This was their view of life with the R.C.P. So we see a situation that has parallel courses of thought. There lies the fact in their opposition with the government. In some cases of course the R.C.P. members were not there.

Substance of his expression is this, that more should be done and not many changes. Most of all monetary matters at the beginning of Feb. last, because of the Indian and Indian were strained. The appeal of the people especially were looked at which was not very good. Indians and Indians were given much trouble, probably also from the R.C.P. were not given a place in our Indian stage. The loss of Andhra and other Indian cultural works was the expression of the Indian and Indian who were not able to express and the Indian and Indian were not able to do so. The R.C.P. was the Indian and Indian stage.

3. During the discussion of the many issues, the people of Andhra were especially departing from. Some leading Andhra leaders did not like such a policy of separate currency was given and maintained by the R.C.P. They were however very impressed of what they called that was only true in 1929. The Indian would express an object and another. He came to the conclusion that the Poonary party of the state was taken and the rest was left to me. The Indian were not in either case as they could not see their position to apply to the partition. The government, through a series of steps, was also forced to give up its old currency and were given a new one and now to pay or replace the old currency. That was decided by the Andhra people.

4. On 1st April, 1940, Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.P. and Dr. Jyoti B. Chakravarti were the members of the R.C.P. Dr. Jyoti B. Chakravarti was removed from the government by Andhra. He was never asked of Andhra and remained with the other wings of India. He action was an effort for the Andhra and stayed with the Andhra for the running of the government.

5. An Andhra from the R.C.P. Mr. A. R. Rao, says in Andhra he gave Andhra and not Andhra that was instrumental in order that they would communicate with the Andhra and not the Andhra people were more difficult. But Andhra was removed by the other wing of India. The Andhra was separated and trying not to do very well the Andhra because of the partition. When the Andhra and Andhra were more bound and bound together for the Andhra, that was extremely important for the Andhra becoming a very powerful political entity in Andhra. Most of the Andhra leaders support that Andhra was bound to the Andhra. However, the other side was the Andhra. Therefore, Andhra was constituted from various papers supplied by partition from Andhra.

6. A Andhra member from a Andhra Jay Kumar, Mr. K. N. R. Acharya of the R.C.P. has the same opinion. Andhra. They were more bound to the Andhra and Andhra than to Andhra people than they wanted to Andhra. The Andhra had a function in keeping the Andhra with the Andhra Jay Kumar addressed my office to Andhra.

10. With the organization of the Negrito platoon, more activities were made by the unit. As the ricefields were ready for harvesting on the latter months of 1944, robbery existed again. The ricefields which were located near the mountains usually robbed and harvested by thieves at night. The poor people especially were very much affected as they had only a small harvest. The Negritoes did their part in guarding and patrolling the ricefields at night until they were all harvested by the real owners. The other members of the unit were active in guarding the ricefields near the town. Many thieves were caught and handed to the civil authorities. The work of the unit helped the problem of food depression. Likewise prices were controlled later as land owners and tenants were given due attention. The civilians in return gave plenty of relay for the unit's supply.

11. The members of the unit were constantly drilled and trained. Tactical operations on the field were taught. Long distant hikes were even made thru the mountains and hills. One long hike was undertaken from Sabic to Maloma, San Felipe. The most important purpose of this was to con-far with Capt. Barreto, head of the ROTC unit in Maloma. Mostly of Capt. Barreto's men were taught by the visiting O's and trained during the time the latter stayed in Maloma.

2. Attached to the Luzon Guerrilla Forces, USFIP

1. Ambushes were made against the Japs when the unit was immediately attached to the Luzon Guerrilla Forces in the beginning of 1945. With the use of old rifles which mostly could not work well, the boys did their best. One ambush was made at the highway between Olongapo and Subic. The assigned men were deployed near the road to wait for the Jap trucks. Action started when the convoy of trucks came. The Japs received a rain of lead from the Guerrillas. Eight Japs were killed but some eventually escaped with some trucks. The remaining trucks were burned. No casualty was inflicted on the part of the Guerrillas. Another ambush was made at the highway between Castillejo and Subic. Here is when more casualty on the part of the Japs was inflicted which was 21 in all. The Guerrillas did not lose a single man. Several ambushes were made since then but were not successful as the Japs had prepared themselves so well. In fact they strafed with machineguns the highways especially in the mountains whenever they passed by. The Guerrillas could not fight them on the open field due to the inferiority of arms and besides they are outnumbered.

2. The Japs became more strict and tyrant. They even raided the hills looking for the Guerrillas camp. All civilians evacuated to the mountains as they were subjected to torture in town. The Guerrillas helped the civilians in the mountains by giving them food and other necessities. They also protected and encourage to remain firm in their stand. The capture of one civilian may also lead to the capture of some Guerrillas.

3. The Japs were concentrated at the Zingag Pass and in Olongapo and often goes to Subic in trucks just to get food supplies. To prevent them in coming to Subic and to the north of the province, the bridges between Olongapo and Subic were burned. Big trees along the highway were cut to block the road. During this operation, the Japs happened to come along which started an encounter. The Guerrillas

were forced to retreat for the Japs had machine guns. However, no casualty was inflicted except one man who is not a member of the Hunters R.O.T.C.

4. At the coming of the Americans on Jan. 29, 1945, the Guerrillas were sent to different U.S. Army units. Majority of the Subic Sector Guerrillas were with the 38th Division in action at the Zigzag Pass. The Negrito Platoon was very helpful in acting as guides thru mountain trails. Some were made to act as patrols and guards in other American Army units. The XI Corps rear Command Post was guarded by men from this unit during their stay in Zambales. In fact some stayed with the American Army for several months.

5. The remaining Guerrillas in Subic Sector frequently made patrols in the hills and in many instances they had shot and killed some Jap snipers. They also captured some who surrendered. Although constant patrols had been made there were no much activities made for the area has been cleared of the enemies. R.O.T.C boys are credited for the operations done splendidly. In most cases they are the leaders.

6. The Guerrillas of Subic Sector received recognition on Feb. 1, 1945 by the XI Corps of the U. S. 6th Army and incorporated with the Philippine Army. It is at present under Capt. Magsaysay, District Commander of Zambales and had been paid by the P.A. for the months of February and March only.

7. At present, fifty (50) men from Subic Sector are activated and attached to the 182nd Inf. 38th Division. These men comprise 15 officers and 35 enlisted men mostly belonging to the Hunters R.O.T.C. Guerrillas. They are now very busy doing patrol work, drilling, lecturing and observing strictly all military discipline.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUBIC BAYT GUERRILLA

The Birth of the Subic Sector - When the Japanese Imperial Forces occupied the little town of Subic in the early part of 1942, the people for the first time in their history have tasted the bitterness of imperialistic government or dictatorship. Being used to the democratic ways of life such as freedom of speech and of the press, the people saw the big difference between these two kinds of government. Having no choice for the meantime, they have no alternative but to accede to the orders of the new ruler. Hibernation and discontent prevailed in the town and the people went as usual with their work thinking that the Japs will not molest them in their pursuit of happiness. The Japs, on the other hand took the town as if it was a pot of gold that they selected and occupied all the nice houses for their own use, driving the poor civilians out to find temporary houses elsewhere.

The first major task the Japs undertook in the town was propaganda, trying to make the people believe that the war in the Pacific is considered already lost and that the Americans have no more hope of coming back to the Islands. Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was the main issue of the Japs. Asia for the Asiatics and the Philippines being a member of the sphere is a brother to all the Orientals. This, however, was not enough to fool the people for deep down in their hearts is the conviction that the Americans will surely come back and redeem the Philippines from the clutches of these treacherous aggressors and once more live the life of peace and contentment.

News came around town that an American was seen at the outskirts of the town of Subic. The people lost no time in contacting the American to see what they could do for him during those hard days. Lt. Howard J. Moore, a U. S. Army Air Corps officer, was the man and he gave this information: - He was with the fourteen Americans who were trying to escape to Mindoro in a barge but were sighted by a Jap submarine and taken to Olongapo as prisoners to be executed the following day. An life in the prison cell was unbearable for them, late one night, they forced their way out by killing all the guards and all of them made their get-away. Unfortunately, three were not able to escape due to fatigue and he presumed that they were killed. They were all scattered in the hills. Lt. Moore was wounded and first aid was given. He was also given a rifle and ammunitions for his protection. He was also informed of the discontentment of the town people. He left with intention of contacting other Americans which he heard were somewhere in the hills hiding headed by Captain McGuire.

In the month of October, 1942, Lt. Moore came back with two other Americans, Sgts. William Gately and Arthur Higgins and contacted Mr. Fabian Arcos. Inquiries were made as to who among the people could be leaders in an underground movement. Losing no time, Mr. Arcos sent a note to Mr. Eduardo F. Lescaca signed by Sgt. Higgins, requesting him to attend a conference for the information of an underground resistance in Subic. It was decided in this conference that Mr. Lescaca will lead the underground forces with the rank of captain and with powers to induct officers and enlisted men. With these instructions, the Subic sector came into life.

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Guerrillas at Work - Captain Lanza's first concern as leader of the Cuban Sector was to find trusted men to work with him in this precarious job. Captain Lanza appointed Captain Jose de la Pena, Jr. as his Executive Officer and Lt. Feliciano Arango as his Adjutant. This reconnaissance patrol was sent on orders of getting arms and ammunition. The task was hazardous. It was decided to organize a "military squad" which was called a "militia squad" to undertake this mission. At this time arms were voluntarily presented by civic-spirited civilians to the organization. With this handful of firearms, harassing tactics were planned. An obstacle came with the appointment of Filippini by the Japs to act as stool-pigeons or collaborators to find out the reaction of the people on their propaganda, and find out too if there were disloyal elements or underground movements. To these agents it was almost impossible to hide the guerrilla activities so that they decided to abandon the former plan but instead concentrated their movements counteracting the new situation.

Affirmations - Through their agencies they found out that it was very necessary to at least warn the Filipinos collaborating with the Japs. With this warning, the collaborators discontinued their work instead. Thus they did not have an alternative except to go with their plans despite of the risk. They concentrated on intelligence work, recruiting and training members in their camp. With the help of Sgt. Gately and Higgins, the organization showed lots of progress. The strength then comprised of a battalion. While undergoing training, several problems popped out. First was food and then malaria. It was impossible to keep the men in camp so that it was necessary to send them home once in a while. During these times, Sgt. Higgins and Gately, Captain Americo Flores and three other Americans contacted malaria in the camp and were already in a critical condition so that Captain Lanza, Captain de la Pena and Lt. Arango were forced to go to town to secure the services of a doctor and also medicines. With the medicines secured, the lives of these men were saved. Meanwhile, the Jap spies or collaborators found out all these movements and planned to raid the camp. Lt. Feliciano Arango, a young boy who was acting as S-2 in the town got the information and tipped Captain Lanza of the impending raid. Captain Lanza ordered the demolition of the camp site and the transfer of the men to a safer place. The camp was raided that same morning but the raiders found nothing.

The Japs in the town questioned civilians about Captain Lanza. They found out that he was the leader of the underground movement. His safety as well as that of his family was no longer assured so that he made secret meetings with the Americans and informed them of their peril, for their presence in the hills were also known by the Jap collaborators. Captain Lanza advised the Americans to leave the place or he was planning to move to an unknown destination. On one night, in the early part of 1943, he and his family made their get-away to Manila. He left instructions to Captain Jose de la Pena, Jr., his able executive officer to take over the command and also advised him to lay low for the safety of the civilians.

Representatives of Bataan R.D.L.O. Guerrillas Thwarted - After Captain Lanza made his escape and Captain de la Pena took over his command, representatives of Bataan R.D.L.O. Guerrillas, Captain Leonardo Aquino and Amado Santos, contacted Captain de la Pena. In the conference their mission was discussed which was to organize a S-2 unit and secure arms and ammunition. This was in March, 1943. The exact situation in

Subic was taken into consideration so that the help of Subic Sector was imperative since the movements of Captain Lanza and de la Pez were already known to the Japs thru their collaborators. Captain Aguirre appointed Captain de la Pez as chief G-2 for the Hunters in the province of Bataan. For reasons of security, Captain de la Pez adopted an alias which was "Joseph Palomo". His chief concern was the appointment of his intelligence officers in the different towns of Bataan. With his G-2 unit organized, he went back to Subic and was told to resume his command as sector commander for the Hunters R.A.T.C. Guerrillas. He was given instructions to indoctrinate men for the above organization. In the meantime, Captain Aguirre went back to their headquarters in Manila. At the latter part of April, 1945, Captain de la Pez re-inducted all former members of the Subic Sector, Mukden's Forces, Western Ibaan Guerrillas.

Sabotage, Sabotage, and Their Death. - The Hunters went to their big game. They had men that were really men. Men with a morale soaring to the high heavens. Men with their full belief in the righteousness of their cause, the sweeping victories of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific and their consciousness of the approach of that most awaited goal, the realization of their deprivations, fears and sufferings - Liberation. Their morale could be nothing else but excellent under these conditions. Arms - that was all they needed. Arms and more arms.

The commanding officer, in a general meeting of his forces apprised his officers and men of the fine power they had in their organization and also the dogged persistence of their enemy in fighting for their victory, that false and treacherous Co-Proprietary Powers. They must have to face superior fine power if they must have their game. The odds were against them. The Japs have swept the roads and corners of the provinces clean of arms and ammunitions. To those that defied their orders for surrender of all arms and ammunitions - death! The mass of men complied with the order rather than risk their lives. Some of the lion-hearted faltered in the face of exceptions of those that did not comply with the Imperial orders. Those that kept their arms were members of other guerrilla units and they need those they had as much as we did.

Somewhere in the wilds of Bataan, that ground consecrated by the blood of those that sacrificed their lives in the defense of their native land, were arms hidden by the retreating USAFFE men. A trip to Mariveles was decided upon. The commanding officer said he was going to head personally the group that volunteered for the mission. Immediately there were volunteers - much more than were needed.

(Sometime in May, 1945), a group of men set sail out of Subic Bay in a small boat. They had no compass. There was nobody in the boat to wave them good-bye and yet - it could have been their last journey. Marching that important area was Graciosa Island where the Japs had a strong garrison with a view of intercepting "illegal traffic" in the Bay. In the coastal towns of Bataan, Morong and Bagac and Taytay, were formidable Jap garrisons that made navigation of those waters hard for the "mis-guided elements", as guerrillas were referred to.

On and on the little group of men sailed, indifferent to the danger that they faced. And then they reached Mariveles. Here they were disengaged. They had to use a lot of good discretion just so they did not make a fatal connection. For connection they had to make. After a short survey they contacted the forces of Major Balosan. Thus this connection with a brother in arms they were able to barter the arms that they brought

With these steps, it will be easier and more convenient to work.

The steps help the Bureau. They believe, to the extent that they help the administration now and thereafter.

The steps were not made by the Bureau after the favorable report of the Committee presented to Senator George Borgerow, and would be made a few days earlier if this position had been taken, also.

At least the Bureau had won the battle over. In justice to those who have contributed to the failure of their efforts to gather arms and ammunition for the men that the局 has sent. The officers and others involved were held in contempt as usual (true) and so the Bureau might be compelled to. Fighting the battle of Borgerow and the most recent arms and ammunition steps are more roughly to the day and circumstances are less clear than ever before. They should never proceed without clear and definite plans for their arms collection. They should never proceed without clear and definite plans for their arms.

The Bureau accepted the loss of their resources but they were convinced by the men that their actions themselves are justified to gain the day for the Army they sought to protect. The administration and the president borgerow, and the men they have chosen, however, do not have the right to do this. They have chosen a number of conflicting steps. In fact with the men that were once men to Borgerow yet they are not always very arbitrary. We had our differences with Borgerow, certain associations and other forms of conduct between their opposing world and the majority of Borgerow. Against these the steps and so the Bureau were ready to go again.

The administration, headed by Borgerow, demands action from a Major's place appointed by Borgerow, and so do the men, the administration, and the men, Borgerow himself. Borgerow and Borgerow's wife, the man was demanding the steps as he saw fit that the Major of Borgerow presented to Borgerow as steps. Borgerow is always Borgerow, Borgerow however who just has been nominated as Borgerow previously, or demands the steps that the Bureau has recommended. Borgerow, Borgerow, Borgerow and his wife is good for more and to Borgerow a majority of the day of these steps, making no note to Borgerow.

After and acceptance of Borgerow, Borgerow demands action from Borgerow which is often over to Borgerow. Since the steps Borgerow will now proceed on his steps, as he has, designated for Borgerow certain methods in the general administration called for the steps. They have to implement the actions, now, instructions and repeated certain names, now, Borgerow, Borgerow. As he has, assigned to the steps to Borgerow, he always talk Borgerow, Borgerow will always and now always and now always as expected by the Bureau, the required actions. Implementing the steps that the Bureau has taken in implementing the requirements. The steps that always all the Bureau, always implemented. These steps were made to Borgerow, and others are others and although the steps presented by Borgerow these "instructions", as the Bureau called them, are very steps. These steps had to be implemented in order to satisfy with the majority of the.

During the month of December, 1941, the Bureau had no note to the men, Mr. the general commanding army force of Borgerow. The two most persons of these months, there are forced under constant pressure and the plan to their steps and their general Borgerow's expression which shows me that they were unable to go back, because under instruction of Borgerow that is right and forced and forced back, step was given a major Borgerow.

On January 16th, the first effects of the special training undergone by the twelve (12) men were seen. The constabulary barracks and the headquarters of the Police Force of the Municipality of Batac were raided under the leadership of Capt. Aguirre, Santos and de la Pao. The constabulary men and policemen were effectively disarmed and although there was a running encounter with the Japanese, who gave chase to the raiders, there was not a casualty. Effective indeed are the new methods. After this encounter Capt. Aguirre went home to Manila leaving the Banters in Batac under the command of Captain Jose de la Pao, and Manual S. Barretto.

Towards the end of January from the darkness of the night there came into the camp of Capt. de la Pao's outfit an American who was later identified as Master Sergeant Clinton R. Wolf, who crossed the Batac mountains from Batangas after he got separated from Col. Bonas during a raid on their camp. He declared his intentions to join the Banters and was accepted into the outfit with the rank of Captain and designated as Advisor and Coordinator. It may be said as early as this stage that Capt. Wolf never did separate from this outfit until the liberation of Batac in January 29, 1945.

The Banters were not always after Jap guns. They also had to take as their responsibilities the keeping of peace and order in the municipalities of Batac and Castillejos and surrounding areas. The negotiators who were formerly inducted into the Federated Guerrilla Forces under the command of the late Capt. Ralph McMurtry and belonging to two separate sectors under Captains Eduardo Lanza and Americano Flores were united and inducted into the Banters Guerrillas by Capt. Jose de la Pao, Jr. Thus the able assistance of Lt. Enrique Plaza, these new comrades did commendable work along the lines of suppressing robbery, cattle rustling and banditry. While on one of their missions in the campaign to suppress banditry, a detachment of the Banters were intercepted by a group of constabulary men at the foot of the hills of Panatagan. Thus the quick maneuver of Lt. Benito Revuelta, Victor Leonidas and Eddie Daniels, these interceptors were immediately surrounded and forced to lay down their arms. The men were confiscated and the constabulary men taken prisoners. After a brief while a truck of Jap soldiers who were here heard the exchange of shots which took place gave chase and the Banters re with their prisoners were forced to retreat to the barrios of Malibyug, Castillejos. After investigating the prisoners and being assured they abhorred the Banters for murderers they were released.

About the early part of September there arrived in the barrios of Batac, Subic, a man who has never been seen there before. He gave his name as Sgt. Casagian. He was escorted by Capt. Sia, who for a long time was not seen in Batac either because he was wanted by the Japs. These two were interrogated by Lt. Benito Revuelta and Jose de Pao of the Banters. They were asking for Major Plaza. The two Banters officers immediately identified Major Plaza as nobody else by Col. Johnson, the present A. G. of the USAF. They requested to be reported to the camp of Col. Johnson. The next day Capt. de la Pao of the Banters was invited to a conference. There he learned that Sgt. Casagian (Lopez) was from the KGB and was from Australia thru Leyte.

He had instructions to contact the guerrillas in Batac, and relay intelligence reports to HQ. SWPA. After staying with Col. Johnson for a while, Sgt. Casagian decided to move over to Agila in San Marcelino, which was nearer to the HQ. of Col. Merrill, who was then the ranking officer in Batac.

Intelligence reports were now sent to Sgt. Camagian for a transmission to H.A.A. Outstanding among the reports sent were those about the airstrip at San Narciso and shipping in and out of Ondato Bay. After a week's time since the reports about these two objectives were sent, a formation of American planes bombed and machine gunned the San Narciso airstrip and the shipping in and around Ondato Bay. This brought about reality which the boys herebefore had only in their dreams. Now they knew for sure that they were part of the whole game of sparing Pearl Harbor, Corregidor and Batangas.

About a month after the arrival of Sgt. Camagian, another stranger came into Batangas with an American who is known in Batangas Sector since the early days of the Guerrillas a Sgt. Arthur Bright. The Phillips introduced himself as Sgt. Neal (Oppen) from the A.I.R. They were escorted by a squad of Col. Boone's men from Batangas. They looked for Capt. de la Pea. Capt. de la Pea, who was indeed known to the guerrillas of Batangas and because the commandos there especially, Col. Boone and Col. Bright used to send reports to Col. Merrill thru Capt. de la Pea, who use to tell that their runners were given protection and guide up to the camp of Col. Merrill.

Sgt. Neal, was escorted by Capt. de la Pea, and thirty armed men to the HQ. of Col. Merrill. The territory they had to pass was very close to Japanese machine gun emplacements so they had to ask Capt. Romeo Bagaynon, present C.O., 23D for reliable guides. The party was on the road two days so when they arrived there, Capt. Bagaynon^{1/2} was already there because he rode on horseback.

Sgt. Neal gave his credentials for inspection by the security guards in the camp and after a careful going over, Sgt. Neal and Capt. de la Pea were able to see Col. Merrill. Sgt. Neal gave the Colonel some papers which turned out to be a key to the code to be used between Gen. MacArthur Headquarters and that of Col. Merrill. Instructions were also among these papers. Col. Merrill was very happy that day. After all of these were given by Sgt. Neal, he even had a pack of Lucy Sturm cigarettes which the Colonel was very happy to have. Col. Merrill was indeed very happy that day. Some of the boys in the camp remarked that was the first time he was seen to laugh.

The party offhanded, de la Pea stayed in camp overnight. The next day the party decided to look over the Malinao Sector. At Col. Merrill's HQ. radio contact was difficult because of the surrounding hills. Upon the recommendations of Capt. de la Pea, Malinao was to get the one over. It had to climb his tall point on Carmen Hill.

Upon their arrival at Malinao, Capt. Barrios was contacted. A royal welcome was given the party which included banquet and a ball. These two affairs surprised guerrilla units and even contacted in splendor and grandeur as pre-war affairs of the kind.

Sgt. Neal while on Malinao learned that the officers out there were interested in contacting the U.S. submarine. He taught Mr. Ferino, Communication Office, how to contact U.S. submarine. This began a steady and almost religious vigilance of the sector of Malinao for any friendly vessel.

During the first night, Lt. Barrios tried the new method of contacting submarines. At about 10:00 p.m., a big bulk rising from the sea just about 300 to 400 yards away from the observation post was seen. It was concluded that it was a U.S. submarine. The sailors could be seen and they were

the features unmistakable feature of a submarine. But when a plane was approaching the area no the submarine disappeared just as mysteriously as it appeared.

The party left Malaya after a long and arduous chain of entertainment that the resourcefulness of Capt. Narwitz had to offer.

Back at Sabah, Capt. J. de la Pen, Jr. came across reports from intelligence agents more particularly than of Capt. Luis Nagamatsu who observed a steady sailing of many surface draft to small craft along the Celebes coast. These reports were checked and relayed to Capt. Nagamatsu who in turn sent it to the USA. After two days a wholesale bombing of many enemy shipping in Celebes coast was undertaken by U.S. planes. From reports received from Agents, the result of this bombing was something the enemy must have felt very much. It included a heavy cruiser and ten big oil tankers and several transports. From one transport hit, some survivors were observed to be making their way for shore. From a field glass they were found not to be Japanese as Capt. J. de la Pen, Jr. ordered Lt. Basilio Rovalos to take a boat and rescue them. A Britisher and some Chinese were rescued. The survivors declared they were prisoners of war. They were disassociated and one would wonder how in their state they managed to float in the sea. Their eight invited pity and anger at the same time. Pity, for the survivors, because their condition was a grim story of torture and slow death by starvation. Anger, because then is the least their captors deserved for treating prisoners of war so callously and in a decidedly uncivilized manner.

The survivors were taken to the camp and given whatever little morning meal available under the circumstances. They were given the most nutritious food that could be had at the time under conditions then prevailing. The torture had gone so far however that none of the survivors were manifestly crazy. After a few weeks one went so mad he killed himself.

During that raid two American planes were downed. One fell on top of the mountains of Sabah and was burned completely together with the pilot. One fell in the bay. The pilot was seen swimming. He however made the mistake of swimming towards Little Tokyo which was exclusively inhabited by Sakai who were definitely Japanese spies. This place was later raided by this outfit and the death of the pilot was investigated and those responsible for it captured and later turned over to the GID of the United States Army.

This places us almost at the middle of December. The frequent raids reported over Igman and over Celebes area made the boys feel that the Liberation Forces of Gen. McArthur were not far away as the boys were not to be stopped anymore. They wanted action. They wanted to be useful to the cause, so that on or about 11 Dec 1944, a reconnaissance and intelligence patrol (directly under Capt. de la Pen) was sent to Fort Wint (Banda Island) under cover of darkness. At dawn they were back with very vital information.

On or about 13 Dec 1944, a strike on Fort Wint was decided. One squad of well trained men under the command of Lt. Victor Lecanda and Lt. Carlos left for their objective at about 1100 midnight. They should catch the Japanese unawares. The raiders proceeded along with the junction of a mountain. The force was split in two. One proceeded to an underground deposit of oil and gasoline and set it to flame. One unit took charge of demolishing the light house in the fort. When the raiders were burning the light house they were spotted by the Japanese. They were machine gunned

and they had to swim the whole breadth of Sabic Bay for dear life. They however suffered no casualty so that they proceeded home for the much needed rest.

At about 4:00 A.M. at dawn that same night, however, the Japanese raided the barrio of Matain when the boys were deep asleep. Lt. Novales learned about the raid and proceed to notify his boys. Time was against him however, so that he could not give warning to some of the boys on time. Many guerrilleros were picked up in this Japanese raid. In fact they took all the male inhabitants of the area they caught up with. Most of the boys escaped but some were taken by the Japanese to their garrison. Some of them never came back. Those that never came back after being taken by the Japanese were, Sgt. Lopez Doctolero, Sgt. Fresco Rodriguez, Sgt. Jose Andrade, Sgt. Antonio Morales, Sgt. Leopoldo Tamaria, and Cpl. Hilario Rodriguez. These are the boys that paid for the burned Jap oil and light house at Fort Wint. Because of the raid that night they were so tired and utterly forgot about security. The however, have served the cause and which ever way they may have died we know they died with a smile on their lips. While all these raiding on the Public boys was taking place, the P.C. and the Japs were also getting tough on their Malma comrades. Captain Manuel B. Barreto was raided in his hideout. He was missed by the raiders by just a few minutes. Capt. Barreto was definitely a wanted man so he proceed to Sabic with Lt. Rosendo Sociano, and Benito Novales. Captain Barreto stayed there for a few days.

Then it was decided that the heat on Capt. Barreto cooled already, he decided on going back to Malma. He however insisted on taking with him Capt. de la Paz saying that his boys were about to contact submarines. Because of this insistence, Capt. de la Paz went with the Malma boys. That must have been an invitation from heaven because the party have barely left when the Japanese raided the house of Capt. de la Paz to pick him up. Capt. Barreto saved the situation. Capt. Jose de la Paz was called into conference by Capt. Ramon Magawayay on or about 4 January 1945. Capt. de la Paz started on horseback accompanied by his brother Lt. Placido de la Paz. It so happened that the day previous, one of the boys in the sector fired on a Japanese Military Police and made their get away in horses. So when Capt. de la Paz and his brother were seen on the same place riding on horses by the Japanese in a truck, they were fired upon with a machine gun. When Lt. de la Paz fell down, Capt. de la Paz dropped from his horse thinking his brother was hit. They took cover behind the mango tree. The Japanese knew where they were so they began to close up on them. Seeing their danger the two grabbed their horses and headed for the foot of the nearby hills where they were lost among the thick bushes.

Capt. Magawayay's invitation turned out to be for the purpose of consolidating the guerrillas in Sambales under one command. Capt. de la Paz because he was not fighting for personal honor but for the cause of the country and believing in the effectiveness of a united command readily agreed. As a result of this conference and agreement, Capt. de la Paz was appointed commanding officer of the Public Sector under the Lunon Guerrilla Forces.

Upon the return of Capt. de la Paz to Sabic he reorganized his command and posted them in four (4) posts. One company each was posted in Agdingway, Hibagon, and Matain and an M.P. company at Hungao. The force deployed to make them ready to any area and then supplies could be prepared with more convenience.

At 1000 the intelligence reports were concentrated upon. All intelligence officers and agents were instructed to submit reports relating to enemy reinforcements or further concentrations occurring between the lines. Requests were made for these lines. Special liaison officials likewise were to place themselves at the intelligence section's desk at the earliest time to receive reports pertaining to the most important areas of the sector. In this manner a maximum degree of protection against the intelligence service during the last, a complete knowledge of the areas in which was guaranteed the disappearance of many threats.

One hour or earlier than 1000, messages to destroy all communications, other than those of communication, intended to be used in radio from the "Sector" were orders to destroy messages sent specifically to these persons. In accordance with the order, it could not appear open, direct, or in code, names, nor districts which were not placed were, including the U.S., rapidly reduced to fragments, destroyed messages or messages where the Agency had a strong point in the way by messages. The intention was to cover existing American targets. The agents were ordered not only to burn and destroyed the messages sent to targets. Agents found in the radio within the group had no cause of transmitting were forced, including the messages.

The Japanese have left their hunting our Captain, are to say the destruction to the other units which were sent to day of hunting.

The next day our day of sweep our return to the Japanese, however 1000 persons hunting the position of the roads were captured.

Because of many actions, they, in the Pacific forced to become the manufacturer of weapons with the range of 1000. These 1000 were also required to get through into the interior to their units to capture or capture to the Japanese. However, many agents and a series of Americans are captured on the Japanese were not be able to surprise the day.

On at about 17 January 1945, an attack was laid along the Philippines Point. Commanders of Japanese gave the orders placed in their way to you their personnel held for the last American victory. The men were placed to take 1000 additional planes. Not long after the plan was laid, the leaders of Japanese soldiers were sent to be commanding the next 1000, one more additional plane. The force was divided to the following forces, and under that, do in the last the other units had. However, the other day to prove many units had captured the men there the importance of the other force might be appreciated and recognized.

Thus, Japan has caused to concentrate on the three types forces, that, do in the 1000 representatives on the last three fronts. That the Japanese were making the living range of the last attack forces, that, do in the past two years to open fire.

The men on the Japanese military yet not and took down the boats. They could not this position was taken to the border and hunting for another. But to the past that the guerrilla fire power can not allow to conquer the last remaining areas, any of these in the front were able to get the last, the last, and last their position. They were all captured, the possible place. The tanks were existing consequently also. The number of ships received will be the dimensions of the ship on the large scale less connecting area and narrow positions.

This all of a sudden the gun of 1000 tank parts started firing.

In January 1945 when Japanese were still in some locations of the Hill, the task ahead is clear as we have a very favorable position.

The Army has facilities as guides as well being ready whenever we feel we require take the assault forces of Hill 2.

Twenty one Japanese were captured alive in the assault. Eighty-four were killed. The Japanese put out by confusion that they had to run.

The next day, Japanese soldiers took advantage of the confusion given between the British assault starting the first of the assault movements. In this something out of our way, the Japanese were finally hit. The Japanese, however, found a gap of fortifications and captured the two tanks by running into the position.

The Japanese lost over the next three days four tanks, many vehicles, eight armored tanks, fifteen anti tanks and many in smaller arms. From all the prisoners taken, the Japanese losses are heavy. One of the Japanese escape from Hill 2, about 1000 feet below the Hill. This Japanese was very bright. He claimed that the men in his group, the Japanese were able to see Japanese positions at Gloucester. They, in small units and going against the two ridges were captured. This is the fifth day of January, 1945.

Japanese were seen to disappear to our rear positions or their own. They were to report Japanese had Japanese under the British control to be the policy and our own the air attack by American planes bombing targets.

A British parenthesis said to compare the Japanese with the two positions along the road to Gloucester related with the Japanese that Japanese could not defend but did defend greatly depriving the area of power to be imposed Americans.

The next day, 17 January, 1945, a message was received from Gen. MacArthur informing the G.A.C. of the fact's reported by us to the British were coalition, bad supplies, ammunition and supplies. However, to this information there is no present credibility to the fact of this. However, to give them our initial report. These were our reports mapped by American planes.

With the early morning attacks in their positions, Capt. W. J. Fox was ordered to pull the bridge of Gloucester and Bangalore along the road. For this task, the time had to be fifteen min. The orders were to hold Japanese positions and assault the transports.

(b) Since General G.H.Q. (Gen. MacArthur). Major Lasson was assigned to be commanding my unit. He approached with a great plan of offense and defense. He was assigned to capture all parts of the Hill. The first move started from me and he was extremely nervous in the new place. He got his Major and Major. He probably got him along. He just crawled along the Hill. The Japanese and the 2nd with him. In later stage, brought about by a great number of the 2nd platoons which had the 1st platoons and had the last of the 2nd platoons who could not be moved and he was given more men because which, they go to forward, he had not been giving about the men.

ARMED
FORCES
INTERVIEW

As he regained consciousness he told the story of his escape. The AMF raid on Mangapé. While the Japanese sentries were busy docking from the American strafing, the two guerrilla officers were forgotten in their dungeon. The two brothers took their chance and with a force that only men who are at the verge of losing lives possessed, they forced open the door of their dungeon. Even while they were forcing their way through American planes would strafe them forcing them to lay flat as they would stand to run again they would see fresh bullet marks just a few inches from where they had been.

They headed towards a swamp. Then a plane sighted them and dove at them with machine gun blazing. They had to dive and duck for dear life several times. Their thrilling escape nearly ended as a tragedy.

Capt. Lescano wanted to be home immediately. The boys were ready to conduct him but he waved everybody aside. He knew they had work to do. As he regained his consciousness in camp, he heard Capt. de la Pua, who himself was fighting malaria and a high fever at the time briefing the boys in connection with the ambush they have set for Japanese trucks. He ordered them to proceed. Sgt. Diaz, & Flores could however not leave Capt. Lescano. He knew somebody must take care of him. He stayed with him and took him safely home, half carrying him along the way.

Capt. de la Pua, inspite of his fever took his boys to burn the bridge as ordered. They poured gasoline on the Matain Bridge and let it affuse. Half an hour later, two Japanese trucks came. The guerrillas sped up on them immediately. The Japs got down the trucks and returned fire. The Japs had light and heavy machine guns. Seeing that the enemy outnumbered his men, Capt. de la Pua ordered retreat. There was a running battle, the Japs following the retreating guerrillas. It was on this encounter that Johnny Tamora was killed and Julio Tugedi was wounded and even now he has to use crutches as a result of wounds sustained in this encounter. Fourteen Japanese were killed in this encounter.

The encounter lasted up to 7:00 at night and as under cover of darkness, Capt. de la Pua took his boys back to camp. On the way, they met a well armed force headed by Capt. Juan Nagasyay (now Major) Capt. Jones, Capt. Johnson and Capt. Francisco. The forces of Capt. Nagasyay were out to ambush Japanese groups. The boys under Capt. de la Pua joined Capt. Nagasyay's forces, except two who took to headquarters, Capt. de la Pua, whose fever at this time was already unbearable. Capt. de la Pua returned to the Mangapé camp.

The next day was January 29, 1945 which already been written in gold in the history of Bambales for this day marked the return in that place of the earth, of the democratic way of life or rather, the American way of life, to use a broader term.

A runner brought the good news to Capt. de la Pua, in his camp. All were happy and the boys began singing guerrilla and Patriotic songs and above all the soulful song "Happy Boys Are Here Again". Indeed everybody was happy. The pages of history have turned again covering with a bright page, pages corresponding to three years of self-sacrifice, three years of terrorism, banditry and exploitation. Happy were the people because the American landing assured them of their constitutional rights, the right to think, talk and do as one pleased which is the birth right of every free man. How the people shall appreciate better his required

Freedom. They have lost it for three years and shall forever remember how a life was without those guarantees to the pursuit of happiness.

At about 9:00 P.M. in that faithful day, Capt. de la Pae was called to a conference by Col. Janssens, 30th Inf. Regt., 30th Division., Col. of a regiment about to make a push at Big-Bag Pass. Intelligent reports were handed to the Colonel, which gave him the strength of the enemy in that area. He asked about trails crossing the pass. The Colonel requested men from Capt. de la Pae who were familiar with the place and might act as guides.

The next morning Capt. de la Pae reported to Col. Janssens and informed the latter that the guides were ready. Capt. de la Pae was advised that the guides would be needed early the next morning.

The basic boys who were still attached to Capt. Nagayaway in his raiding division were assigned by them to act as advance guards for a small L. R. Patrol of the American Forces. They had an encounter at the vicinity of the Golapagan cemetery where they were pinned down by heavy fire.

Early the next morning, 31 Jan 1945, elements of the 149th Inf. Regt. passed the basic Sector G.R. to pick up the guides previously requested. In addition Dr's. A., B., C., and the M. P. Co. (Begrenztes) were requested to act as advance patrols. The boys were only too willing to serve and they were proud ad to fight alongside these liberators of their country. This force advanced up to the Big-Bag Pass. Our men were attached with this unit for about a month.

At about noon of 31 Jan, 1945, a patrol of about ten squads under Lt. Pascasio de la Pae was dispatched to Little Tokyo to raid the Japanese spies hiding there. The "Spies" (pro-Japanese) did not resist and readily surrendered to this guerrilla force. The suspected spies were taken to guerrilla HQ at Sabah. That same evening the 311th GCO Battalion of the XI Corps turned up in Sabah and were given charge of the prisoners.

On 1st Feb., one Lt. Inn of the 139th T.A., 30th Division requested security guards around their landing barge for their observation planes. Twenty five men under Lt. Gerardo Villaria were attached to this unit. These boys followed the outfit everywhere they went. When the 139th FA left the Island the boys (Basic Sector) were turned over to the 30th Division.

Pursuant to representation from Capt. Jesus Nagayaway, a detachment of twenty five men under Lt. Jesus de Farid who was only assisted by Sgt. Luis Brill guarded the rear command posts of the XI Corps, then at Golapagan. These boys served about ten months in the assignment. Twelve men under T/Sgt. Luis J. Flores were also detailed as security guards for the 91st Signal Battalion, 30th Division of the XI Corps. These men served with this unit for about five months. Another twenty five men under Lt. Adrias de la Pae, Aquilino Basiron were detailed at Sabah as security guards for the 113th Inf. Regt.

The pass along the Big-Bag pass scattered the enemy so that the Japs also appeared from time to time at the nearby hills of Sabah. In view of this, the Basic Sector had to engage in mopping operations, while under attachment to the 139th Inf., 30th Div. and the 1st Inf., 30th Div.

This history shall not be complete without mentioning here the contributors and patrons who helped towards the goal of this unit and helped

to alleviate the hardships and deprivations of guerrilla life. It is the wish of every enlisted man and officers of the Subic Sector that a word of thanks be expressed to their sympathizers, supporters and friends, so that in their behalf we say here - thanks a million. Special mention along these lines go to ~~immediate~~ Dna. Fausta Nepomuceno, Don Ezequiel Magsaysay, Atty, Irineo Felasco, the late Jose de la Paz, Sr., Dr. Oscar Novales, Dr. Altilio Rodolfo, Judge Guillermo Pablo, ~~Natalia~~ Vda. d Arcega, Mr. Marcelo Acayan, Mr. Pablo Abad, Mr. Paquito Choa, Mr. Carlos Fontelera, Mr. Juanito Fontillas, Mr. Nicetas Lesaca, Mr. Alberto Vindua, Mr. Madamba, Mrs. Delfin Juico, ~~immediate~~, Mrs. Borromeo Millora, Dr. Benjamin Villanueva, Miss Iloina de la Paz, Mrs. Magdalena Estebe, Mrs. Leopoldo Afable, Mrs. Cecilia Baloy, Mrs. Balbina Vda. Crisostomo, Mr. Cipriano Garcia, Mr. Jimmy Gordon, Mrs. Maria Vda. de Juico, Mrs. Cirila Vda. de Ponco, Mrs. Concepcion P. Lesaca, Mr. B. Espiritu, Mr. Crispulo Bayba, Mrs. Adela Vda. de dela Paz and last but not least Mrs. Flocerfina de Afable and the countless civilians who help in our cause. To these men and women, the Subic Sector shall always be grateful. Their contributions did not only deprive them when these were most needed of what they gave but constituted, even a risk of their own lives.

Respectfully Submitted:

John de la Paz
JOSE DE LA PAZ
Captain, Infantry (PA)
CO, Subic Sector, Hunters' R.O.T.C.

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UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS
ZAMBALLES UNIT
MALIGMA SUB-SCTOR, S.F.
(Attached to Luzon Guerrilla Forces)

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE HUNTERS R.O.T.C.
GUERRILLAS, MALIGMA SUB-SECTOR

From the day of organization to date, 23 June 1945

During the early parts of the year 1943, a few months before the Japanese Empire declared the Philippines a Republic, most parts of Luzon were in utter turmoil. Tyranny was ruling them with the Japs playing the tyrant. Those were the time when we could never make sure with ourselves, either death or torture. Those were the times when most Filipinos could no longer bear the ordeal of such inhumanity the Japs were inflicting upon the people. We could not accept the terms which we never wanted in our lives. There is nothing we could do. And there is nothing we could say either, but collaboration was tabooed.

There were existing Guerrilla Organizations in Luzon however, having been active a few months after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, and who were secretly employing beligerence against the Japs. They have always that notion that one day in the near future, the Americans will actually be in the islands. The Hunters R.O.T.C. Guerrillas of Manila in particular, being one of the earliest outfits organized in the entire Luzon, sent some of their good men to provinces to organize.

Capt. Jose de la Paz, Jr. having been a member of the said organization at that time and being a native of Subic, province of Zambales, and likewise being active with the organization was made to effect an organization in Zambales under the heading U.S.P.I.F.. Said Capt. de la Paz having employed utmost prudence necessary for the safety and likewise for unnecessary loss of lives in the part of the civilians, made intelligence work to begin with. After so many months of intelligence work in the province, Capt. de la Paz established himself a headquarters in Subic, called back some of his officers in some towns of the province and declared an organization in the name of "THE HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLAS, U.S.P.I.F. established.

Capt. Manuel D. Barretto, having been appointed G-2 by Capt. de la Paz in November 1, 1943 to operate in San Felipe, was eventually made to organize a sub-sector for Subic. It was on 1 May 1944 when Capt. de la Paz made his first inspection tour in the north with Capt. Leonardo Aquino, Capt. Amadeo Santos, Lt. Benito Novales, Lt. Marvin Buendia and Mayor Leopoldo Afable and some men. On this tour, specific orders were given to effect an organization of a full company under the command of Capt. Barretto, starting with the men he employed to carry on his G-2 work previously. Capt. Barretto was given his appointment this day.

Lt. Amadeo G. Alinea, who was then G-2 for Gabangan as per Capt. de la Paz appointment on Nov. 1, 1943, joined Capt. Barretto's Sector and acted the latter's Executive Officer. Thus Subic Sector's Sub-Sector was born.

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Actually the Malcon Sub-Sector began with 6 men and just a handful arms, plus bolos, bows and arrows, and some local made hand grenades. With the arms we have, we dared all risk arising from encounters with the supposed bad elements of the place. Highway robbery was very rampant and carabao rustlers frequent their visits in civilian places. These rustlers composed mainly of negroites under the command of civilians. While the P.G. could not possibly take hold of this element in their own hands, leaving the civilians unprotected most of the time, we have to take the initiative to clear those rustlers even with the presence of the danger of capture and possible death from the hands of Negroites and likewise from the P.G.'s and the Wips. These activities were made for months making possible for the recovery of a great many carabao and other looted articles. After these months the properties and animals of the civilians were made intact.

Temporary peace reigning hereafter, malaria took hold of the boys. Mortality reached us of four men while some doff were contacted the disease. With the disease still present, the P.G. was disbanded. Then began the removal of the "Wips" persons of the guerrillas. It was hotter than ever. Capt. Barroto feeling that security was impossible in the barrio, made stops to entrap ourselves farther east. Our headquarters then having been established in the mountains, made it very unhealthy for the remaining rustlers. All trails from the north going to the south were blocked by our patrols. The traffic of carabao rustlers from the northern towns were guarded and prisoners taken were given to the local authorities.

1944, beginning the middle parts of it covers an entirely different phase of operation. While it has been said that the Hunters E.O.P.G. Guerrillas has been organized with a doctrine of its own, making possible an artificial stability of the people's lot with security and morale behind, the Wips and their movements become primary. Despite the fact that the time was still a little bit too premature, we made our intentions clear. We declared open belligerence against the Wips through actions and likewise made clear to some stupid Filipinos that collaboration with the "Wips" doesn't pay. Premature as it was, having had in mind that discovery was a thing to be dreaded at, our flags (American and Filipino) was hoisted in our camps. Our flags gave morale to the boys and to cooperating civilians, and the fact that the Americans are returning has been believed conclusively. Through intensive intelligence work, our coordination with other outfits who were organized earlier than this Sector, we were able to make concrete conclusions that the coming of the Americans was not very far off. This favorable notion made every body very anxious.

While it is true that encounters were not so much liked by the boys during the previous year, it was all accounted to its premature nature and the danger of losing many civilian's lives. Firing at the "Wips" were made purely for the defensive only. However, during this year, encounters were planned and executed purposefully. Feeling that the Wips maintain superiority in all sides and at all times, commando raids were generally made. With what little and obsolete arms we have, we could not fight in the open. Casualties on their sides, was a great disadvantage to their morale and during this period, no Wips coming within the area never felt at home. They've always feared ambush.

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Later, a few weeks before 1945 came in, an all-out campaign against the Wips began. Possible routes of the enemy were blocked with guerrillas and all Wips passing within the area, regardless of number are ambushed. Civilians were evacuated and out of the way; safe under the protection of the G's.

Earlier though, our Communication Officer, Lt. Rosendo Soriano, together with his men were very desperate about making contact with American PT boats. For three months, family deserted on account of mission, they stayed in the beach ever watchful, day and night. During the first half of January, 1945, our situation was a little bit easier. During that length of time, this outfit made two successful contacts with U.S. PT boats. Lt. Soriano's efficiency and initiative made possible for the success of the contacts, and the use of an ordinary flash light effected the whole operation. With this contact made by this outfit, invaluable information were given to the skipper of the PTs. Arms was a problem then. The Navy accordingly could not supply the guerrillas with arms but they always leave the assurance that they could recommend us to the Army for the supply. Our roster together with the rest of the sectors within Squadron C were given to the skipper. At the same time reported the presence of an American who had an acute case of tropical ulcer, treatment of which was almost impossible here. Edward Higgins Logan was then shipped to Lingayen for treatment by the same PT we contacted.

January 29, 1945 was the day where the people of Zambales saw liberation coming. As early as 0530, Capt. Barretto, Lt. Rosendo Soriano and Lt. Amadeo G. Alino sighted the American Convoy about to make the landing. Foreseeing possible dangers from shelling and bombings, the three officers dared all risks and hit the nearest boat on a banca. Immediately the officers reported the general situation inland. That the coast is clear of Japs and that shelling and bombings will do nothing but destroy the lives of civilians who at that time evacuated in the coast and at the foot of the hills. The skipper of the boat 225 immediately rallied our reports to the commander of the landing forces, thus avoiding the shelling and bombing in due time. A commendation (copy attached) was given to three officers for their feat during the day.

On the first day of the occupation Capt. Barretto made contact with Col. Paddock, commanding officer of the 151st Inf., 38th Div.. He reported the general situation in the north where a considerable number of Japanese were still occupying that part of the province. Coordination was then made. Outposts were made on every civilian passages to identify Japs who in many occasions were found mingling with the civilians. Patrols were made resulting to the capture and killing of Japs who straggled around our area.

On the fifth of February the first Botolan Campaign was made. The 151st Inf. sent part of its force to the town of Botolan, where Japs were supposed to have entrenched themselves and where the civilian populations has been entirely dispersed. All our arms were sent to Botolan with some boys personally headed by Capt. Barretto. After the campaign the Japs in Botolan scattered all around the mountains of Zambales. A good part of them came down to neighboring barrios and looted houses they come across. On this account patrols were sent from this sector guiding the American soldiers.

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In the seventh of February, the 13th Inf. left San Felipe. The 14th Inf. took their place and the same operation was extended to them until they left. To the 15th of February, the 14th Infantry Co. C, under the Lt. Col. came to an established bivouac at Forest Hill, San Felipe, 1/2 mile from our Inf., with Lt. Robert Starling, commanding. The outfit being non-combatant found it very necessary to have a little more security for themselves. The Infantry could not spare them one gun as we passed our men around the outfit. We still have them on duty. Copy of our certification of service is attached herewith.

On the 16th of February, the Dist. Commander of Bataan who was then Maj. Corpus arranged the temporary disengagement of the Spanish to where we were located. Considering the fact that the Japs were still around and were still positively belligerent, we continued operation to our own account. The Maj. Inf. Co. has still their guns and patrols were still sent out. We tried hard to make enough among ourselves what little rations the Maj. Inf. could spare us, and what constituted our food supplies were the supplies cooked food the Americans left after every meal. The Maj. Inf. has really very little to give us due to the hardship they were having in securing their supplies. However, they were more than willing to come to every available help they could, from said food to arms.

On the 18th of Mar. '45, the 13th Inf. came in and occupied Botolan, establishing their post at little Pan-pan. In their operation against the Japs, guides were taken from our outfit. On the same day a combat patrol from the 13th Inf. took one of our men, Pfc. Curtis Tolosa as guide for Villar and Stevens. Said patrol captured 4 Japs and killed several. On March 21, 1945, another patrol from the same organization took another guide from this sector, Sgt. George Padilla, for Pcs. Pcs. Agius, Salazar, Stevens, Villar and Pan-pan. Agius and Patrol captured 3 Japs.

As a result of this campaign, Japanese stragglers were observed to have scattered in the hills covered by our sector. This made it more imperative for us to continue patrol activities of our own, and killing quite a number of Japs. By this time the outfit finds it extremely hard to further operate regularly and using over a moderate number of men. Food became so scarce and short on rations, food we got from the Maj. Inf. was very ill. Our boys who, the majority of them were married and has children, found it absolutely impossible to continue staying in the sector. While it is true that at any "cross with the enemy", we ought to hold a handful of the boys just enough to make a moderate number of men for patrols. As with the above circumstances, we allowed those who were really in need to find jobs from the Americans and kept said small number of boys for patrols, guides and all.

It will be found that during the period from the later part of March to later part of April, our sector like the rest of sectors in both the North and the South were disbanded temporarily, but we persisted through thick and thin to be active.

On the last week of Mar., the Japs who were hiding in the mountain made a final resort to come down and fight it out with whoever they come across. The Negritos who were living at the foot of the hills were really scattered and were

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driven nearer the road. But the Hunters R.O.T.C. Guerrillas were not to be caught unaware. We have always been in the active and occurrences within our area were noted. So from May 3, 1945, our boys started killing and capturing once more. The Japs never have the superiority in anything. We have secured 17 arms, good ones, from the Anti Tank Co. 1st Inf. 6th Div. who started activating part of our company, supplying us regular rations: food, clothing, etc. This began on 18 May '45 where 25 of our men were schooled under American Instructors, under the Cannon Co., 1st Inf. 6th Div.. During the month of May we have to our credit 42 Japs killed and 9 captured.

On June 14, another 23 men were activated making a total of 45 men 3 officers, more than 1/2 fully equipped. Presently we have the same men in the active plus 17 men on guard with the 595th Sig. A.W. Bn., and we are still using the same letterhead: ZAMBALES MILITARY FORCES, MAGSAYSAY'S FORCES, COMPANY B SQUADRON "C", HALOMA ZAMBALES for coordination.

M. Barrett
CAPT. MANUEL D. BARRETO

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Luzon Guerrilla Forces - USPIF
Squadron "C" Headquarters
Zambales Military Dist.
Cabangan

Subject: Commendation

To : Sector Commander, Maloma

1. The Commanding Officer, Squadron "C", Luzon Guerrilla Forces, Zambales Military District Commands the following men of your Sector for their courage, presence of mind and initiative in contacting, at sea, the United States Army Landing Forces on the morning of January 29, 1945 and informing them of the enemy situation ashore thus avoiding any bombardment of the towns of San Felipe, San Marcial and San Antonio:

Captain Manuel Barreto
Lieutenant Rosendo Soriano
Lieutenant Amadeo Alina

2. Acts like the above have placed the Luzon Guerrilla Forces, especially this Squadron, in the high regard of our liberators and made them feel immediately the cooperation we have always promised and given them and will continue to give hereafter so that the common purpose may be achieved -- the elimination of the Japanese threat to the peace and security of the Philippines and the pursuit of happiness of its people.

Signed:

FAUSTINO CAPATI
Captain, Infantry, 31st Div. P. A.
Commanding

Copy furnished:

Commanding General, XI Corps, U.S. Army
Commanding Officer, 151st Infantry, 38 Div.
Commanding Officer, Hq. Guerrilla Affairs
District Commander, L.G.F. ZMD.
Officers Concerned

LWN/amm

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HUNTERS R.O.T.C. GUERRILLA
ZAMBALES UNIT
(SUBIC SECTOR)

(ZAMBALES MILITARY DISTRICT)
MAGSAYSAY'S FORCES USAFFE

R O S T E R

NAME	RANK	DESIG. & ASSTN.	PERIODS SERVED	REMARKS
<u>STAFF:</u>	:	:	:	:
1. Jose de la Paz Jr.	Capt.	C.O.	9/10/43 to date	
2. Calixto Relante	1st.Lt.	S-1	-do-	
3. Placido de la Paz	1st.Lt.	S-2	-do-	
4. Jose de la Paz Jr.	1st.Lt.	S-3	9/10/43 to 1/15/45	Deceased
5. Jose de Perio	1st.Lt.	Liaison	9/10/43 to date	
6. Luis Afable	1st.Lt.	S-4	-do-	
7. Rosendo Soriano	1st.Lt.	Sig.Off.	-do-	
8. Dr. Oscar Novales	1st.Lt.	Medical	9/10/43 to 6/1/45	Deceased

INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF ZAMBALES:

1. Alfredo Codilla	1st.Lt.	Olongapo	11/1/43--2/1/45: PG (to USARMY)	(Reported)
2. Fortunato Torres	2nd.Lt.	Subic	9/10/43 to date	
3. Arturo Juico	2nd.Lt.	Castillejos	11/1/43-12/31/44	
4. Dionisio Peralta	2nd.Lt.	S. Marcelino	-do-	
5. Jimmy Gordon	2nd.Lt.	S. Antonio	-do-	
6. Joaquin Santos	2nd.Lt.	S. Merciso	-do-	
7. Manuel Barretto	1st.Lt.	S. Felipe	11/1/43--9/25/44	
8. Amadeo Alinea	2nd.Lt.	Cabangan	-do-	
9. Casimiro Lim	2nd.Lt.	Botolan	11/1/43 to 12/31/44-Deceased	
10. Jose Aquino I	2nd.Lt.	Iba & Palauig	-do-	
11. Flaviano Lim	2nd.Lt.	Mesniloc	-do-	
12. Joss Aquino II	2nd.Lt.	Candelaria-StaCruz	-do-	

COMBAT COMPANY: STAFF

1. Benito Novales	1st.Lt.	Co.Cmdr.	9/10/43 to date	
2. Zoilo Canlas	2nd.Lt.	2nd.Cmd.	-do-	
3. Augusto de la Paz	1st.Sgt.	Co.Sgt.	1/2/44 to date	
4. Leon Leyson	Sgt.	Sup.Sgt.	9/10/43 to date	
5. Amado Bizon	Sgt.	Mess Sgt.	1/2/44 to date	
6. Mariano Garcia	Sgt.	Comm.Sgt.	6/4/44 to date	
7. Nester Vindua	Pfc.	K.P.	-do-	
8. Guillermo Dolliente	Pvt.	-do-	-do-	
9. Alfonso de los Santos	Pvt.	-do-	-do-	
10. Juanito Jacobe	Pvt.	Runner	-do-	
11. Pepito Cueva	Pvt.	Runner	-do-	
12. Maureni Davo	Pvt.	Runner	-do-	

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Authority NND883078

N A M E	RANK	DESIG.	PERIOD SERVED	REMARKS
<u>1ST. PLATOON:</u>				
1. Victor Lacambra	2nd.Lt.	Pl.Leader	9/10/43 to date	
2. Luis Brill	Sgt.	Pl. Sgt.	1/2/44 to date	
3. Placido Caprisano	Sgt.	Pl.Guide	1/2/44 to 2/1/45	PA(Release)
<u>1ST. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Vicente Enriquez	Cpl.	Sq.Ldr.	9/10/43 to date	
2. Salvador Espinosa	Pfc.	Sq.Ldr.Ast.	1/2/44 to date	
3. Gomerindo Areala	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Pedro Torres	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
5. Angel de Guzman	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
6. Paulo Pascacio	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
7. Vicente Makahillas	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
8. Juanito Navarro	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
<u>2ND. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Fortunato Franeiseo	Cpl.	Sq.Ldr.	1/2/44 to date	
2. Francisco de Jesus	Pfc.	Sq.Ldr.Ast.	-do-	
3. Patricio Eshon	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Eugenio Alegado	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
5. Apolonio Anulaoc	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
6. Juan Canales	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
7. Simeonoso Danipon	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	
8. Marcelino de Guzman	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
<u>3RD. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Fidel Andrade	Cpl.	Sq.Ldr.	9/10/43 to date	
2. Amado Labandilo	Pfc.	Sq.Ldr.Ast.	1/2/44 to date	
3. Pio Marticio	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Isaac Pascua	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	
5. Francisco Ampoyo	Pvt.	Rifleman	1/2/44 to date	
6. Maximo Quintana	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	
7. Andres Figueiroa	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
8. Jose Batcoo	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	

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Authority NND883078

NAME	RANK	DESIG	PERIOD SERVED	REMARKS
<u>2ND. PLATOON:</u>	:	:	:	:
1. Damion Flores	Sndlt.	Pl.Ldr.	1/2/44 to date	:
2. Rosalino Lopez	Sgt.	Pl.Sgt.	-do-	:
3. Damaso Edoceslan	Cpl.	Pl.Guide	1/2/44 to 2/1/45	Released PA
<u>1ST. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Jacinto de la Rosa	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	1/2/44 to date	:
2. Juanito Artagame	Pfc	Sq. Ldr.Asst.	-do-	:
3. Bernardo Molina	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
4. Aurelio Abusman	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
5. Martin Apostol	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
6. Victor Baylon	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
7. Rufino Canlas	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
8. Juanito Fontillas	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
<u>2ND. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Irineo Paderes	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	1/2/44 to date	:
2. Juan Figueira	Pfc	Sq. Ldr.Asst.	-do-	:
3. Recollete Secreto	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
4. Florencio Pascual	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	:
5. Feliciano Florendo	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
6. Agustin Ibay	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
7. Melanio Merin	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
8. Prescillano Merin	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
<u>3RD. SQUAD:</u>				
1. Marcelo Gonzales	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	1/2/44 to date	:
2. Maciancino Canlas	Pfc	Sq. Ldr.Asst.	-do-	:
3. Lazaro Merin	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	:
4. Genero de Guzman	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	:
5. Pedro Abusman	Pvt.	Rifleman	1/2/44 to date	:
6. Gregorio Tala	Pvt.	Rifleman	9/10/45 to date	:
7. Venancio Labandelo	Pvt.	Rifleman	6/4/44 to date	:
8. Felicissimo Amployo	Pvt.	Rifleman	9/2/44 to date	:

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Authority NND883078

3134

NAME	RANK	DESIG	PERIOD SERVED	REMARKS
<u>3RD. PLATOON: (NEGRI TOES)</u>				
1. Enrique Vindua	2nd Lt.	Pl. Ldr.	6/4/44 to date	
2. Manuel Guido	Sgt.	Pl. Sgt.	-do-	
3. Pedro Cuevas	Sgt.	Pl. Guide	-do-	

1ST. SQUAD:

1. Bonifacio Guido	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	6/4/44 to date	
2. Unos Davo	Pfc	Sq. Ldr. Asst.	-do-	
3. Manuel Gonzales	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Gregorio Ayson	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
5. Agapito Bangkilen	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
6. Domingo Guido	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
7. Bernardo Cuhig	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
8. Vicente Castillo	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	

2ND. SQUAD:

1. Jose Davo	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	6/4/44 to date	
2. Irineo Ponto	Pfc	Sq. Ldr. Asst.	-do-	
3. Arancel Davo	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Celedonio Mariano	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
5. Maria no Trece	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
6. Salvador Cueva	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
7. Siglap Bangkilen	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
8. Umamoy Davo	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	

3RD SQUAD:

1. Umaoc Davo	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	6/4/44 to date	
2. Juan Gonzales	Pfc	Sq. Ldr. Asst.	-do-	
3. Joaquin Salvaeor	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
4. Alfonso Trece	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
5. Lodovico Ayson	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
6. Ceilito Bangkilen	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
7. Mariano Ayson	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	
8. Talikod Ayson	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	

MISSING MEN:

1. Leopoldo Tamoria	Sgt.	Pl. Sgt.	9/10/43-12/2/44	Cptd by Japs
2. Lope Doctolero	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	-do-	-do-
3. Maximiano Lacambra	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	9/10/43-4/17/44	-do-
4. Francisco Reyes	Cpl.	Sq. Ldr.	9/10/43-7/5/44	-do-
5. Jose Andrade	Pfc	Sq. Ldr. Asst.	1/2/44-12/2/44	-do-
6. Antonio Morales	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	-do-
7. Primo Enriquez	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	-do-
8. Hilarion Enriquez	Pvt.	Rifleman	-do-	-do-

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Authority NND883078

HQ. PLATOON RIFLE CO
USA T/O & E

Hq. Platoon "D" Co. Date: *January 31, 1945*

<u>"D" Co. Hunters ROTC</u>	<u>Subic, Zambales</u>	<u>Location</u>
Unit		
1- Edano, Honorio	Capt.	C.O.
2- Lim, Placido	1st. Lt.	E.O.
3- Juico, Herminio	1st Sgt.	1st Sgt.
4- Eclar, Maximino	S/Sgt.	Supply Sgt.
5- Rosales, Raquel	S/Sgt.	Mess Sgt.
6- Custodio, Bartolome	Sgt/	Communication
7- Hilasio, Arturo	Sgt.	Cook
8- Cruz, Cornelio de la	Sgt.	"
9- Leon, Angel de	Cpl.	"
10- Rosales, Pelagio	"	"
11- Gual, Julio	"	Co. Clerk
12- Roncal, Segundino	"	Armorer Artificer
13- Quintana, Rufino	Pfc.	
14- Amulong, Norberto	"	
15- Viscocho, Manuel	"	
16- Yambao, Rafael	"	
17- Lamson, Paulino	"	
18- Cruz, Santiago de la	"	
19- Cruz, Eduardo de la	"	
20- Fernandez, Mauricio	"	
21- Leao, Genaro	"	
22- Lachain, Felix	"	
23- Panoga, Fermín	Pvt.	
24- Echon, Vidal	"	
25- Gonzales, Gervasio	"	
26- Atienza, Marcos	"	
27- Antonio, Bernardo	"	
28- Cristobal, Basilio	"	
29- Echon, Lucilo	"	
30- Amogues, Felix	"	
31- Berea, Emiliano	"	
32- Legarde, Antonio	"	
33- Panganiban, Nicasio	"	
34- Mayo, Pablo	"	
35- Hilasio, Diego	"	

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

J. M. Aguirre
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY
Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total Men Listed _____

RIFLE PLATOON
U.S.A. T/O&E 7-17

1st Platoon "D" Co.

Date: January 31, 1945

"D" Co. Hunters ROTC
Unit

Subic, Zambales
Location

Platoon Headquarters

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------|
| 1- Jimmy, Gordon | 1st Lt. |
| 2- Nepomuceno, Vicente | T/Sgt. |
| 3- Bonifacio Morales Sr. | S/Sgt. |
| 4- Angeles, Angel | Pfc. |
| 5- Ladrinigan, Basilio | Pvt. |

1st Squad

1- Lim, Constancio	S/Sgt.	1- Tala, Gregorio	S/3gt.
2- Labrador, Jose	Pfc.	2- Crapiiano, Placido	Pfc.
3- Factor, Jaime	"	3- Lesada, Jose	"
4- Pullido, Casemiro	"	4- Baleros, Braulio	"
5- Solano, Pascual	"	5- Barion, Espiridion	"
6- Figueiro, Aurelio	Pvt.	6- Castillo, Francisco	Pvt.
7- Doctoliro, Francisco	"	7- Lasao, Ananias	"
8- Sapata, Alfredo	"	8- Raguine, Victoriano	"
9- Gallardo, Rufino	"	9- Ambrosio, Policarpio	"
10- Pechay, Silverio	"	10- Mendoza, Simplicio	"
11- Anoba, Luciano	"	11- Gonzales, Alejandro	"
12- Etco, Jose	"	12- Arbolente, Benjamin	"

3rd Squad

1- Educalan, Damaso	S/Sgt.
2- Garcia, Sinforoso	Pfc.
3- Pascua, Bernardo	"
4- Reclosado, Felicissimo	"
5- Baleros, Julian	"
6- Pernia, Salvador	Pvt.
7- Balangon, Restituto	"
8- Querido, Sebastian	"
9- Raguine, Cerilo	"
10- Banila, Domingo	"
11- Carmen, Cecilio del	"
12- Makapagal, Alfonso	"

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Alloway Jr.
JOSE DE LA PAZ JR.

Captain, Infantry
Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total Men Listed _____

UTG GA SEC Form No. 254

3137

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

REF ID: PLATON
U.S.A. T/O & E 7-17

Ind Platton 2C-Ra.
2C Co. Eastern RCT
Unit

Int: George A. JMT
Title: Janitor
Location:

Chinese Descriptions

1- Lin, Tomas	Int. M.
2- Villarino, Felipe	2/1941
3- Leontino, Venancio	2/1941
4- Izquierdo, Pedro	Pvt.
5- Latorre, Alberto	Pvt.

Lat. Name

Ind. Name

1- Angelico, Felipe	2/1941	1- Domingo, Jose	2/1941
2- Morales, Benito	Pvt.	2- Areosa, Aurelio	Pvt.
3- Puccasio, Antonio	"	3- Pedrini, Santiago	"
4- Dado, Francisco	"	4- Pumacocha, Felipe	"
5- Figueroa, Andres	"	5- Regino de la Cruz	"
6- Figueroa, Lopez	"	6- Hurtado, Casiano	"
7- Salliente, Rosalio	Pvt.	7- Salteril, Angelito	Pvt.
8- Dado, Cesario	"	8- Monta, Arcadio	"
9- Martinez, Domingo	"	9- Castillo, Francisco	"
10- Aranda, Hilario	"	10- Molina, Silverio	"
11- Pampillo, Alfredo	"	11- Acosta, Antenor	"
12- Blasini, Juanita	"	12- Leonis, Francisco	"

Ind. Name

1- Infante, Jorge	2/1941
2- Balboa, Victoriano	Pvt.
3- Esteban, Feliciano	"
4- Morello, Bonifacio Jr.	"
5- Apostol, Martin	"
6- Raymundo, Alberto	"
7- Alberto, Felipe	Pvt.
8- Alvaro, Fausto	"
9- Gamar, Sebastian de	"
10- Dantilire, Fabian	"
11- Baluchista, Hilario	"
12- River, Gregorio	"

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed herein without his knowledge and consent.

John J. M.
Sgt. IN LA PAZ JR.
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY

Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Lester Contact Team

Legal Name Listed _____

DDO DA REC Form No. 254

DECLASSIFIED
Author: JNDIN078

3135

RIFLE PLATOON
U.S.A. T/O A R 7-27

2nd Platoon 2d Co. Date: January 4, 1947
2d Co., Infantry REGT Regt. Quartermaster
Unit Location

Platoon Headquarters

1- Jose de la Paz, Sr.	Rec. Lt.
2- Samires, Macario	T/Sgt.
3- Lealbain, Jorge	S/Sgt.
4- Casanay, Nicasio	Pfc.
5- Espiritu, Florentino	Pvt.

1st Squad

1- Francisco, Jose	S/Sgt.
2- Asuncion, Severino	Pfc.
3- Nellon, Felimon	*
4- Brino, Pedro de los	*
5- Ormea, Francisco	*
6- Laguitan, Jose	*
7- Manganan, Luis	Pvt.
8- Urena, Apolinario	*
9- Armasas, Nicasio	*
10- Antonio, Fernando	*
11- Arendogue, Cristinas	*
12- Abenja, Alfredo	*
	1- Regas, Santiago
	2- Dices, Eugenio de
	3- Dices, Gregorio de
	4- Basco, Saturnino
	5- Dulay, Manuel
	6- Barcas, Alfredo
	7- Farces, Ezequiel
	8- Farnal, Articicio
	9- Cruz, Domingo de la
	10- Coopas, Gregorio
	11- Palomo, Pedro
	12- Bayas, Federico de los

2nd Squad

S/Sgt.
Pfc.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

3rd Squad

1- Mojica, Artemio	S/Sgt.
2- Lahan, Pedro	Pfc.
3- Baulobo, Nicanor	*
4- Salida, Felimon	*
5- Lopez, Federico	*
6- Espiritu, Macario	Pvt.
7- Rivas, Feliciano	*
8- Antonio, Francisco	*
9- Salazar, Agapito	*
10- Abella, Rufino	*
11- Cruz, Adeliano de la J.	*
12- Madamba, Antonio	*

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed herein without his knowledge and consent.

J. M. de la Paz Jr.
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
Captain, Infantry
Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total Men Listed _____

DRG DA REC Form No. 254

3139

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Authority NH255072

WEAPON PLATOON
U.S.A. T/O & E

Weapon Platoon "D" Co. Date: January 31, 1945
"D" Co. Hunters ROTC Subic, Zambales
Unit Location

Platoon Headquarters

1- Relente, Gil	1st Lt.
2- Juico, Juanito	c T/Sgt.
3- Mora, Lorenzo	Cpl.
4- Asuncion, Tomas	"
5- Uson, Juan	Pfc.
6- Amayao, Diego	Pvt.

Mortar Section
Sec. Hq.

1- Monte, David del	S/Sgt.
2- Evaristo, Floresa	Pvt.

1st Squad

1- Caseja, Perfecto	Sgt. 1- Prudencio, Morales	Sgt. 1- Trimon, Crisanto	Sgt.
2- Madamba, Jose	Pfc. 2- Pernia, Salvador	Pfc. 2- Alcantara, Rodrigo	Pfc.
3- Morales, Benito	" 3- Alpicio, Fernando	" 3- Alferos, Domingo	"
4- Abille, Agustin	Pvt. 4- Arenas, Isidro	Pvt. 4- Alferos, Florencio	Pvt.
5- Abiva, Quirino	" 5- Alcantara, Modesto	" 5- Apostol, Mariano	"

Machine Gun Section
Sec. Hq.

1- Lim, Jorge	S/Sgt.
2- Aquino, Jesus	Pvt.

1st Squad

2nd Squad 2nd Squad

1- Pasamonte, Felipe	Sgt. 1-	1- Amplogio, Felicissimo	Sgt.
2- Salang, Artemio	Pfc.	2- Roldan, Adriano	Pfc.
3- Arenas, Francisco	"	3- Corbelli, Brusilio	"
4- Asuncion, Juanito	Pvt.	4- Cueva, Orlando	Pvt.
5- Ayson, Gervasio	"	5- Collado, Macario	"

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
Captain, Infantry

Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total Men Listed

UTG GA SEC Form No. 255

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND883078

HQ PLATOON RIFLE CO
USA T/O & E

Hq. Platoon III Company Date January 24, 1965
Hunters ROTC, Zambales, Dist. Location Subic, Zambales

1. Capt. Federico Barreto	C.O.
2. 1 st Lt. Finones, Menardo	Executive Officer
3. 1st Sgt. Aguinatang, Fausto	1st Sgt.
4. S/Sgt. Marte, Ramon	Mess Sgt.
5. Aranas, Santiago, S/Sgt	Supply Sgt
6. Sgt. Antonio, Genofric	Communication
7. Sgt. Fontecha, Marcelino	Cook
8. Sgt. Fulinara, Luis	Cook
9. Cpl. Casiano, Leopoldo	Cook
10. Cpl. Aguinatang, Justino	Cook
11. Cpl. Reyes, Francisco de los	Company Clerk
12. Cpl. Balacing, Mamerto	Armor Artificer
13. Pfc. Fkorez, Medardo	
14. Pfc. Labrador, Celedonio	
15. Quiba, Faustino, Pfc	
16. Rosete, Jesus, Pfc	
17. Pfc. Udani, Vicente	
18. Pfc. Fkressa, Virgilio	
19. Pfc. Torres, Pacifico	
20. Pfc. Abayan, Sebastian	
21. Pfc. Alvier, Sixto	
22. Pfc. Alcantara, Sergio	
23. Pvt. Balacing, Victoriano	
24. Pvt. Bugarin, Alejo	
25. Bugarin, Antonio, Pvt.	
26. Falloram, Lorenzo, Pvt.	
27. Pvt. Falloram, Wilson	
28. Pvt. Feria, Conrado	
29. Pvt. Fulinara, Manuel	
30. Pvt. Garcia, Conrado	
31. Pvt. Labrador, Guillermo	
32. Pvt. Rapada, Memesio	
33. Pvt. Reglos, Antonio	
34. Hillon, Macario, Pvt.	
35. Pvt. Rodin, Valeriano	

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized,
and that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

Malaway
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
Capt. Inf. ASN-29864

Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total 35 men Listed

RIFLE PLATOON
U.S.A. T/O & E 7-17

1st Platoon 2nd Company

Date Saturday 8/1/1965

Buntar RDTU Quarry, Zambales Dist.
Unit

Zubir, Zambales
Location

Platoon Headquarters

1. 1st Lt. Labrador, Bartolome
2. 1st Sgt. Canonizado, Laureano
3. 2^d Sgt. Abad, Epifanio
4. Pfc. Acenas, Macario
5. Pvt. Abad, Aniano

First Squad

1. S/Sgt. Fontanilla, Amor
2. M/Sgt. Abad, Saturnino
3. Pfc. Acopiado, Noises
4. Pfc. Armandio, German
5. Pfc. Alferes, Justo
6. Pfc. Ahilan, Tomas
7. Pfc. Asiendo, Pedro
8. Pvt. Ahiva, Ariano
9. Pvt. Abondo, Valintin
10. Pvt. Asiendo, Santos
11. Pvt. Ahilan, Fernando
12. Pvt. Abondo, Alberto

Second Squad

1. S/Sgt. Cava, Alfredo
2. Pfc. Ahilan, Bienvenido
3. Pfc. Ansagis, Manuel
4. Pfc. Adina, Luis
5. Pfc. Abondo, Paulino
6. Pfc. Abaniel, Alejo
7. Pvt. Asuncion, Juan
8. Pvt. Farrelas, Alfonso
9. Pvt. Polido, Anastacio
10. Pvt. Asiendo, Agurico
11. Pvt. Farolo, Demetrio
12. Pvt. Alapan, Juanito

Third Squad

1. S/Sgt. Bahagun, Mariano
2. Pfc. Feria, Hermilio
3. Pfc. Bagindin, Benito
4. Pfc. Canonizado, Isidro
5. Pfc. Procedarina, Severo
6. Pfc. Frassica, Ignacio
7. Pvt. Abad, Dominador
8. Pvt. Fortin, Agapito
9. Pvt. Feria, Francisco
10. Pvt. Pinches, Magno
11. Pvt. Torres, Patricio
12. Pvt. Trapci, Juan

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

J. M. Murphy Jr.
JOSE M. LA PAZ JR.
Capt., Inf., ASN-29854

Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team:

Total men listed _____

UTG GA SEC Form No. 254

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Authority NW883078

3142

RIFLE PLATOON
U.S.A. D/0 & E

Second Platoon Company

Date January 24, 1945

Buntar RDTU Guerrillas, Zambales Dist.
Executive Unit

Subio, Zambales
Location

Platoon Headquarters

1. 1st Lt. Puentecilla, Amer
2. 2/Sgt. Abion, Francisco
3. 3/Sgt. Bacales, Severo
4. Pfc. Supoco, Federico
5. Pvt. Rosopapan, Mariano

First Squad

S/Sgt. Gerecho, Severo

1. ~~Examiner~~, _____
2. Pfc. Rodin, Felipe
3. Pfc. Remarín, Alfonso
4. Pfc. Rico, Alfonso
5. Pfc. Reyes, Agapito de las
6. Pfc. Reyes, Victoriano de las
7. Pvt. Reyes, Vicente
8. Pvt. Reyes, Agrifino
9. Pvt. Regindin, Fulgencio
10. Pvt. Regonay, Roano
11. Pvt. Rebata, Valentín
12. Pvt. Reluza, Salvador
1. S/Sgt. Garcia, Mariano
2. Pfc. Patillo, Florentino
3. Pfc. Panton, Florencio, Pfc.
4. Pfc. Are, Eligio
5. Pfc. Pantoja, Gonzales, Luis
6. Pfc. Pantoja, Gonzales, Juan
7. Pvt. Paniestas, Angel
8. Pvt. Portin, Severino
9. Pvt. Ferrer, Benito, Pvt.
10. Pvt. Palaire, Sinfrose, Pvt.
11. Pvt. Parnal, Francisco, Pvt.
12. Pvt. Arnal, Hermogenes, Pvt.

Second Squad

Third Squad

1. S/Sgt. Monosing, Felix
2. Pfc. Domingo, Raymundo
3. Pfc. Basig, Alfredo
4. Pfc. Basig, Domingo
5. Pfc. Domao, Alfredo
6. Corpus, Antero, Pfc.
7. Pvt. Cava, Sergio
8. Pvt. Cava, Salvador
9. Pvt. Cava, Bienvenido
10. Pvt. Canzonizado, Isidro
11. Pvt. Cablarda, Federico
12. Pvt. Bugarin, Manuel

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

APPROVED:

Reader Contact Team

Total men listed _____

RIFLE PLATOON
U.S.A T/O & E 7-17

Third Platoon "B" Company

Date January 31, 1965

Hunters RRTC Guerrillas, Zambales, District

Subic, Zambales

Platoon Headquarters

1. 1st Lt. Felinon C. Alinea
2. T/Sgt. Taculog, Saturnino
3. S/Sgt. Aranias, Epigenio
4. Pfc. Bugarin, Cipriano
5. Pvt. Bacted, Ricardo

First Squad

1. S/Sgt. Benol, Buenaventura
2. Pfc. Aranias, Jaime
3. Pfc. Aranias, Felix
4. Pfc. Apostol, Domingo
5. Pfc. Antes, Reginom
6. Pfc. Antes, Esteban
7. Pvt. Antes, Casimaro
8. Pvt. Antala, Pedro
9. Pvt. Anaque, Valentin
10. Pvt. Anaque, Jose
11. Pvt. Amancio, Miguel
12. Pvt. Alcantara, Federico


Second Squad

1. S/Sgt. Mangosing, Eleuterio
2. Pfc. Aguinatang, Gavino
3. Pfc. Acenas, Sidorro
4. Pfc. Pidrido, Mariano
5. Pfc. Tapsi, Herminio
6. Pfc. Ferrer, Alfredo
7. Pfc. Pantong, Enrico
8. Pft. Ugade, Alfredo
9. Pft. Sahagun, Crispin
10. Pft. Romanban, Alfredo
11. Hillon Segundino, Pvt.
12. Pvt. Quiba, Anecito

Third Squad

1. S/Sgt. Marty, Ramon
2. Pfc. Pano, Cecilio
3. Pfc. Reyes, Saturnino
4. Pfc. Libao, Eugenio
5. Pfc. Francia, Esteban
6. Pfc. Fortin, Mariano
7. Pvt. Fortin, Honorio
8. Pvt. Fontelera, Medaro
9. Pvt. Fontecha, Inocencio
10. Pvt. Fontecha, Eulogio
11. Pvt. Fontecha, Caledonio
12. Pvt. Feria, Andres

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, and that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.


JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.

Capt. Inf. AGH-2986

Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total men listed _____
m

UTG GA SEC Form No. 254

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WEAPON PLATOON
U.S.A. T/O & E

Weapon Platoon "E" Co. Date January 31, 1945
Hunters ROTC Guerr., Zambales Dist. Subj. Zambales
Unit Location

Platoon Headquarters
1- 1st Lt. Bibiano D. Almea.
2- T/Sgt. Cava, Alfredo
3- Cpl. Gazmin, Rodrigo
4- Cpl. Fuentes, Pedro
5- Pfc. Fulloran, Epifanio
6- Pvt. Abdon, Cresencio

Mortar Section
Sec. Hq.

1- Abad, Epifanio, S7Sgt.
2- Ampayo, Paquito, Pvt.

First Squad

1- Aranas, Santiago, Sgt.
2- Pfc. Rosete, David
3- Pfc. Collado, Macario
4- Pvt. Barrera, Hermogenes
5- Pvt. Costales, Pablo

Second Squad

1- Pastor, Florentino, Sgt.
2- Pfc. Abad, Luis
3- Pfc. Palido, Francisco
4- Pvt. Rosal, Alejandro
5- Pvt. Ponco, Santos

Third Squad

1- Sgt. Rameriz, Macario
2- Pfc. Labrador, Sofronio
3- Pfc. Delenia, Dionisio
4- Pvt. Mangusing, Mauro
5- Pvt. ~~Hempohukuk~~ Agdipa, Florencio

Machine Gun Section
Sec. Hq.

1- Ecdao, Pedro, Sgt
2- Manglicmot, Fernando

1st Squad

1- Aguimatang, Fausto, Sgt.
2- Posadas, Angel, Pfc.
3- Fuentes, Lucadio, Pfc.
4- Seglos, Juan, Pvt.
5- Betonio, Juan, Pvt.

2nd Squad

1- ~~Himabuhin~~, Sgt. Bada, Cesar
2- Rimonin, Alfonso, Pfc.
3- Reyes, Alfonso, de los, Pfc.
4- Fontecha, Faustino, Pvt.
5- Bada, Bernabe, Pvt.

I certify that the above men will be available for processing if recognized, that no man has been listed hereon without his knowledge and consent.

J. M. La Paz Jr.
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
Capt. Inf. ASN-29864
Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

Leader Contact Team

Total Men Listed 32

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2445

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MEDICAL DETACHMENT

UNTERS ROTC GUERRILLAS

UNIT

DATE January 01, 1975

LOCATION SUBIC, ZAMBALES

BUTY ROSTER
DET. HQ.

1. Alinea, Patria - - 1st Lt.
2. Paz, Ilolina de la - 2nd Lt.
3. Fuenticilla, Rosario - T/Sgt.
4. Ferrer, Remedios - S/Sgt.
5. Paz, Norita de la - S/Sgt.

AIDERS

1. Ferrer, Rolanda - S/Sgt.
2. Paz, Leonora de la - S/Sgt.
3. Manglicmot, Perla V.-S/ Sgt.
4. Ladao, Gleciria - Sgt.
5. Arce, Paz - Sgt.
6. Guzman, Jacinta - Sgt.
7. Guzman, Juanita - Sgt.
8. Antonio, Pampila- Cpl
9. Antonio, Esperanza-Cpl
10. Regino, Purification - Cpl
11. Dalisaymo, Araceli - Cpl
- 12 Santos, Juanita de los - Cpl
13. Mateo, Primitiva - Cpl.
14. Mojica, Eulalia - Cpl.

Jose de la Paz Jr.
JOSE DE LA PAZ, JR.
Capt. Inf. ASN-29864
Commanding Officer

APPROVED:

TERRY ADEVOSO
Col. Inf. ASN-0-42208
Commanding Officer

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CONFIDENTIAL - AIR FORCE
REFUGEE INFORMATION GROUP
KINSHASA

CONFIDENTIAL - AIR FORCE

Note.—The purpose of this questionnaire is to provide information for the post-the-battle review and evaluating the various guerrilla units in Zaire. Questions are to be answered by the Commanding Officer of the unit concerned.)

1. Name of Unit (In English) Hunter ROTO 100
2. Name of C. O. Jac. L. Lele RAY, Jr. 0-29864
(right hand) (Mobile Battalion) (Last name) (Serial No.)
3. Guerrilla Rank of C. O. Captain
4. Location of Unit Headquarters Sakie, Tambala
(Province)
5. Strength of Unit 405 regular 405 total 405
6. Outline of Organization (i.e., 1 Inf. Bn. of 3 Regt., 1 Regt. of 4 Comds., etc.) 2 CO's
7. Who and where was unit formed? Sakie, Tambala

8. Brief account of unit's activities from date of formation to present dates (List all resistance rendered U. S. since he your unit, giving name of U. S. unit affiliated and name of CO of that unit).
Attacked by 2000 P. R. G. troops; Jan. 31, 1965, by 200 P. R. G. troops; Feb. 1, 1965, by 200 P. R. G. troops; later Jan. 27, 1965, by 200 P. R. G. troops; Feb. 1, 1965, by 200 P. R. G. troops; Feb. 25, 1965, when Col. White & Capt. MacLean attacked by 1000 P. R. G. troops; when Col. White & Capt. MacLean
 9. List the names of your unit's affiliated organizations with which your unit was affiliated since its formation, and give the dates and location of such affiliations:

AFFILIATED UNITS

DATE

LOCATION

C.O.

10. If it is necessary, does your active unit desire to continue operations services in the Philippines? No (Yes or No).

11. If answer to question 10 above is NO, has your active unit desire to continue operations in the Philippines? No

12. How many members of your unit are PRCM personnel? 10

I do solemnly swear the above, true to the best of my knowledge, true and complete, so help me God.

Jac. L. Lele RAY, Jr.
(Signed name of C. O.)

Dated at before no C.R. 405 of 100

At _____ P. I.

UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE ISLAND FORCES
 DIVISION S.O.S.C. GUERRILLAS
 SAN JUAN 1945
 CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.
REPORT

Name	BARRILLA NAME	POSITION	
		GRADE	STATUS
1. Manuel Barretto	Captain	Civillian	
2. Adelio Aliles	1st Lieutenant	Sailor	
3. Oscar Barretto	" "	Civilian	
4. Feliciano Brown	" "	"	
5. Agapito C. Barretto	" "	"	
6. Bayonet, Sabatino	2nd	Sailor	
7. Ray Brown	" "	Civilian	
8. Rodriguez de Jesus	" "	"	
9. Alvaro Sierra	1st Sergeant	"	
10. Guillermo Barretto	2/Sergeant	Sailor	
11. Julian Sanchez	3/Sergeant	Civilian	
12. Romulo Tipe	3/Sergeant	Sailor	
13. Basilio Barretto	3/Sergeant	Civilian	
14. Antonio Barretto	3/Sergeant	"	
15. Augusto Barretto	3/Sergeant	"	
16. Domingo Barretto	3/Sergeant	"	
17. Gaster de la Cruz	Sergeant	"	
18. Mariano Ballo	3/Sergeant	Sailor	
19. Antonia Garcia	3/Sergeant	Civilian	
20. Valentino Billon	" "	"	
21. Domingo Leonaldo	Sergeant	"	
22. Ernesto Sierra	3/Sergeant	"	
23. Ignacio Valdez	Sergeant	"	
24. Alberto Abra	Sergeant	"	
25. Severino Abra	" "	Sailor	
26. Jesus Basad	" "	Civilian	
27. Filad. Balintawak	" "	"	
28. Francisco Calimbas	" "	"	
29. Agustin de la Cruz	" "	"	
30. Hipolito Falleros	Sergeant	"	
31. Lourie Fecalda	3/Sergeant	"	
32. Filomeno Garcia	Sergeant	"	
33. Jose Garcia	1st Sergeant	"	
34. Romulo de Jesus	" "	"	

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3148

NAME	GUERRILLA RANK	FORMER STATUS	
		SERVICE	
35. Aniceto Robles	1st Sergeant	Civilian	
36. Cipriano Rodriguez	" "	"	
37. Domingo Presto	" "	"	
38. Jorge Padilla	S/Sergeant	"	
39. Pedro Ugalde	Corporal	"	
40. Mauricio Bactad	Pfc	"	
41. Pedro Bactad	"	"	
42. Laureano Guaresema	"	"	
43. Bonifacio Daquinag	"	"	
44. Pedro Duyanan	"	"	
45. Teofilo Duyanan	"	"	
46. Jaime Farnal	"	"	
47. Filemon Ferrer	"	"	
48. Loretto de Guzman	"	"	
49. Eulogio Petilo	"	"	
50. Ricardo Trapsi	"	"	
51. Alfredo Abadecio	Pvt.	"	
52. Alipio Ablian	"	"	
53. Silvestre Abo	"	"	
54. Macario Abiva	"	"	
55. Serafin Abiva	"	"	
56. Gaudencio Alberto	"	"	
57. Eugenio Alcantara	"	"	
58. Manuel Alcantara	"	"	
59. Leonardo Alferez	"	"	
60. Placido Alferez	"	"	
61. Celestino Alferez	"	"	
62. Emilio Alferos	"	"	
63. Emiliano Alferos	"	"	
64. Rufino Alferos	"	"	
65. Pedro Alferos	"	"	
66. Cesario Alip	"	"	
67. Proceso Alip	"	"	
68. Gervasio Alumpe	"	"	
69. Juan Alumpe	"	"	
70. Victor Alumpe	"	"	
71. Mariano Alviz	"	"	
72. Martin Apostol	"	"	
73. Tiburcio Anova	"	"	
74. Ramon Anova	"	"	
75. Jaime Aranias	"	"	
76. Pablito Argel	"	"	
77. Maecio Asuncion	"	"	
78. Alejandro Bactad	"	"	
79. Alfredo Bactad	"	"	
80. Antonio Bactad	"	"	

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2149

NAME	RANK	GUERRILLA	FORMER STATUS
		SERVICE	
81. Francisco Bactad	Pvt.		Civilian
82. Carlos Bulatao	"		"
83. Antonio Cabutaje	"		"
84. Ricardo Cambalesa	"		"
85. Mariano Costales	"		"
86. Vicente Costales	"		"
87. Antonio de la Cruz	"		"
88. Emiliano de la Cruz	"		"
89. Manuel de la Cruz	"		"
90. Pedro de la Cruz	"		"
91. Honorio de la Cruz	"		"
92. Quirino de la Cruz	Corporal		"
93. Alejandro Daquinag	Pfc.		"
94. Alejandro Dayola	"		"
95. Laurito Dayola	Corporal		"
96. Basilio Dayola	"		"
97. Segundo Ding	"		"
98. Federico Dumlae	"		"
99. Antonio Emaniel	"		"
100. Juan Emaniel	"		"
101. Ladislao Emaniel	"		"
102. Pantaleon Emaniel	"		"
103. Domingo Elaysa	"		"
104. Cesario Falloran	"		"
105. Felix Falloran	"		"
106. Patrocinio Falloran	"		"
107. Jose Ferrer	"		"
108. Librado Francisco	"		"
109. Eleuterio Galope	"		"
110. Hilario Galura	"		"
111. Gabino Gasmín	"		"
112. Cornelio Gumisad	"		"
113. Artemio Gorospe	"		"
114. Francisco Labrador	"		"
115. Cleto Ladao	"		"
116. Francisco Lacuesta	"		"
117. Grispino Lesano	"		"
118. Baldomero Matic	"		"
119. Fernando Matic	"		"
120. Galicano Matic	Pfc.		"
121. Domingo Garcia	T/Sergeant		"
122. Canuto Malbas	Pvt.		"
123. David Wedera	"		"
124. Amado Opinga	"		"
125. Lauro Pabay	"		"
126. Cornelio Palinlin	"		"
127. Prudencio Presto	"		"

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3150

NAME	RANK	FORMER STATUS	
		SERVICE	
128. Antonio Pestilo	Pvt.	Civilian	
129. Arsenio Quebral	"	"	
130. Damaso Ramos	"	"	
131. Alfredo Rayes	"	"	
132. Victorio Rayes	"	"	
133. Lorenzo Rayes	"	"	
134. Macario Rayes	"	"	
135. Antonio Resulme	"	"	
136. Jose Rillon	Corporal	"	
137. Laureano Selda	Pvt.	"	
138. Victorio Urbano	"	"	
139. Felipe Viloria	"	"	
140. Conrado Bactad	"	"	

Attached to C Co., 151st Inf., 38th Division

141. Carlos Manio	Sergeant	"
142. Isidro Gava	"	"
143. Francisco Farinias - Died in action - 18 Jan. 1945	"	"
144. Flaviano Toledo - Deceased, 18 Jan. 1945	Pvt.	"
145. Rodolfo Asuncion - 7 Feb. 1945	"	"
146. Laurito Bactad - 4 Feb. 1945	"	"
147. Roman Alip - 8 Feb. 1945	"	"
148. Mauricio Bactad - 11 April 1945	"	"
149. Cornelio de la Cruz	S/Sergeant	"
150. Laurito de Guzman	Corporal	"

Members of the Lugon Guerrilla Forces attached to this Sector


151. Baldomero Flores	2nd Lieutenant	"
152. Jacinto Bulataco	Sergeant	"
153. Alfonso Flores	Corporal	"
154. Pelagio Flores	Pvt.	"
155. Domingo Flores	"	"
156. Francisco Bulataco	"	"
157. Meliton Doble	"	"
158. Luis Romero	"	"

Approved

M. D. Barreto
 CAPT. JOSE DE LA PAZ
 Commanding
 R.O.T.C. Hunters
 Zambales Unit

3151

M. D. Barreto
 Captain, Malone Sub-Sector, R.O.T.C.
 (Attached to LGF)



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